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Tort Law and Alternatives authored by Stanford Law School pro-
fessors Marc Franklin and Robert Rabin, and recently released in its
Seventh Edition, continues to serve as an excellent casebook.' To
paraphrase the introduction to the American Broadcasting Company's
popular sports anthology, the Wide World of Sports, the casebook
spans the country2 to bring students the constant variety of tort litiga-
tion.3 Tort law is, in a sense, very traditional-late 19th and early 20th
century caselaw provides much of its foundation and many of the ba-
sic doctrines have long been settled. At the same time, tort law un-
dergoes continuous metamorphosis. Franklin and Rabin have man-
aged to maintain a good balance between the old chestnuts, such as
* Professor, Rutgers Law School (Newark). I attended Stanford Law School (Class of 1981) and
was a student in Marc Franklin's Torts class.
1. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2001).
2. In earlier editions of the casebook, the authors predominantly used cases from New York
and California state courts. With each edition, the authors have progressively added geographic
variety so that the principal cases increasingly come from jurisdictions other than New York and
California. In the seventh edition, the authors have added cases from jurisdictions whose cases
were not represented among those featured as principal cases in the sixth edition. Id. at 18
(Utah), 24 (Texas), 95 (Florida), 110 (Rhode Island), 186 (Washington), 198 (Nebraska), 207
(Louisiana), 215 (Arizona), 359 (New Mexico), 399, 917 (Iowa), 452 (Oklahoma), 476 (South
Carolina), 632 (New Hampshire), 876 (North Dakota). The authors increasingly feature federal
cases as principal cases even in the negligence portion of the book. Id. at 41 (citing United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947)), 64 (citing Andrews v. United Airlines,
Inc., 24 F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994)), 117 (citing Connors v. Univ. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecol-
ogy, Inc., 4 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1993)), 250 (citing Cope v. Scott, 45 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
3. "Spanning the globe to bring you the constant variety of sport." STEVEN D. STARK,
GLUED TO THE SET 156 (1997). The sports anthology went on to say it "captured the thrill of
victory and the agony of defeat"-not surprisingly, the book does not seek to do that.
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Brown v. Kendall,4 Byrne v. Boadle,5 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Co.,6 McPherson v. Buick,7 Escola v. Coca-Cola,8 Summers v. Tice,9
Ybarra v. Spangard,1° Carroll Towing v. United States," Martin v.
Herzog,12 Tedla v. Ellman,3 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.,
14
Rylands v. Fletcher," and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,16 as
well as cases raising very contemporary topics, such as "toxic torts,'
' 7
"wrongful birth," "wrongful life," law enforcement liability for invit-
ing journalists to accompany them on their searches, 8 and "loss of a
chance of life."' 9
In their new edition, the authors have made substantial changes
while retaining the basic organization of the materials. They have
added a few new sections-most importantly one new section more
fully exploring vicarious liability has been placed in the casebook's
first chapter and a second highlighting work-related injuries from de-
fective products now appears in the products liability chapter. They
have also significantly revamped several other sections, including
those covering medical malpractice, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and defenses to intentional tort causes of action. The authors
4. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
5. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
6. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
7. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
8. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
9. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
10. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
11. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Ironically, the Learned Hand test, while not particularly
useful as an algebraic formula, has application outside the field of torts. So, exposure to this sort
of cost-benefit analysis will benefit students who study topics as diverse as administrative law,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and the First Amendment, e.g., Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
12. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
13. 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939).
14. 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) ("the timorous may stay at home").
15. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 E. & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
16. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). See text accompanying notes infra 26-30 (discussing cov-
erage of other classic cases in notes following principal cases).
17. See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir.
1990) (hazardous chemical spills), Hymonowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)
(DES-related birth defects).
18. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). An even more recent "constitutional" tort cause
of action attacks the law enforcement practice of parading arrestees before the news media solely
to allow journalists to photograph the arrestee. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
19. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 361 (excerpting Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d
1279 (N.M. 1999)). This case replaces Falcon v. Memorial Hospital, 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich.
1990).
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have replaced cases in several other sections as well, even a few staples,
such as Rowland v. Christian° and Hoven v. Kelble.2'
The rich and extensive notes following the principle cases remain
a particular strength of the casebook. The notes serve a wide variety
of purposes. And indeed, at times, the organization of the notes ap-
pears a bit of a haphazard-sometimes one can discern no obvious se-
quencing of notes on various concepts. Almost invariably, the first
few notes following the principal case focus on the principal case itself
and pose questions that encourage students to consider the case more
thoroughly. These notes often highlight the implications of the case's
procedural posture.
The authors also use notes to introduce substantive concepts re-
lated to the concepts illustrated in the principal case. The notes fol-
lowing McPherson v. Buick and Escola provide particularly good ex-
amples of this technique. In McPherson, the New York Court of
Appeals expanded manufacturers' liabilities to include injuries pro-
duced by defective products sold to consumers indirectly through in-
dependent retailers. Escola features a concurrence by California Su-
preme Court Justice Roger Traynor that provides a classic statement
of the rationales underlying the development of strict products liabil-
ity. The notes after these two cases discuss whether strict products li-
ability applies to various types of potential defendants, such as fran-
chisers, product lessors, and sellers of used products, and whether
various categories of potential plaintiffs can pursue strict products li-
ability claims, including non-purchaser users of the product and by-
standers who suffer injury from the product.22 The notes following
the duty to rescue cases, Farwell v. Keaton23 and Harper v. Herman,24
provide a second example of the use of notes to discuss topics related
to principal cases. In their notes, the authors elaborate on the various
exceptions to the general rule that citizens have no legal duty to rescue
others in obvious peril, alluding to the various Restatement (Second) of
Torts sections on the subject.2S
20. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
21. 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
22. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 550-55.
23. 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
24. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993).
25. Ernest J. Weinrib has authored a superb article, which I have excerpted and assigned,
discussing the judicial refusal to impose a general duty of rescue. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for
a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247-58 (1980). However, students find the article extremely
challenging. It does, however, put the duty to rescue doctrine into a broader context and intro-
duces the very useful concept of pseudo-nonfeasance---conduct that might be characterized as
nonfeasance, but which on further analysis taking into account a longer time frame, qualifies as
misfeasance. See, e.g., Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). In Harper, the plain-
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The notes also allow the authors to describe and briefly quote
some of the old chestnuts that fail to make the casebook as principal
cases. The authors cover H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensaleer Water Co.,
26
Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co.,27 Wagner v. International
Railway Co.,2  Ploof v. Putnam,29 and The T.J. Hooper in this manner.3"
Often, the notes offer information regarding subsequent devel-
opments related either to the principal case or the doctrine established
by the case. For instance, after Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,31 the authors chronicle the legislative responses to the
case.12 Such notes provide a bit of an institutional context, teaching
students that the executive and legislative branches also shape tort
law. On occasion, the notes will discuss judicial elaborations of the
doctrine in the principal cases, like the notes following Dalury v. S-K-I
Ltd.,33 Riss v. New York, 34 and Hymonowitz v. Eli Lily Co.,35 though
the authors use notes in this manner less frequently. Sometimes the
notes report information concerning subsequent stages of the litiga-
tion-such as the results of the retrial in Ybarra v. Spangard.
36
The notes also often elaborate upon the law, providing the stu-
dent with the alternative approaches that courts have taken, at least
when the principal case itself does not outline the alternative ap-
tiff sought damages from the defendant boat owner because the defendant failed to warn him
that the spot at which the boat was anchored was too shallow for diving. Looking at the chain of
events from the time the defendant anchored the boat, defendant's conduct can only be described
as nonfeasance. Taking a broader perspective, examining the course of events from the point
when defendant selected the spot to anchor the boat, the defendant's conduct can be described as
misfeasance. In particular, defendant was arguably negligent in his choice of a location in which
to anchor the boat or in failing to warn his passengers of the dangers awaiting them in the loca-
tion at which he anchored the boat.
26. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
27. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
28. 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
29. 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
30. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
31. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
32. In the sixth edition, the authors used the notes to chronicle the statutory response to
Kelly v. Gwinnell and Rowland v. Christian. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 163 (Notes 4 and 5), 177-78 (Note 4) (6th
ed. 1996).
33. 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995).
34. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
35. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 230-33 (Notes 1-6), 465-66 (Note 6), 388-89
(Note 6). In the sixth edition, the notes following Williams v. Cunningham Drug Store, Inc., 418
N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1988), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 32, at 180, provide a particularly
good example of this use of notes. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 32, at 183-84 (Notes 3-4).
36. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 106-07 (Note 3).
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proaches" In addition to providing related cases, the authors often
note the Restatement treatment of the issue.
The authors also offer thought provoking questions that force
students to explore the rationale and potential limits of the doctrine
discussed in the principal case. The authors use thought provoking
questions and notes to explore the difficulties posed when a plaintiffs
injuries could have been produced by either of two completely inde-
pendent causes." Another of my favorite series of questions, which
the authors discarded in the new edition, raises the slippery slope
problems created by the secondary harm doctrine. Defendants are li-
able not only for the harm initial they cause, but also for subsequent
injuries their victims suffer during the course of medical treatment.
Defining the precise extent of defendant's liability for subsequent
mishaps presents difficulties-not every subsequent injury should be
attributable to the initial defendant's negligence. For example, if a
plaintiff suffers injury in a traffic accident that occurs two weeks after
defendant negligently caused him injury and while the plaintiff is be-
ing transferred from one hospital to another in an ambulance proceed-
ing at normal speed, should defendant still bear legal responsibility for
the injuries that the plaintiff sustained in that later mishap?39 Yet
37. In the new edition, many of the cases that the authors have added canvass the alterna-
tive doctrinal approaches to the issue under consideration.
38. One example of such a situation involves two separate negligently set fires, the first of
which bums plaintiff's house to the ground and the second of which burns the charred remains
shortly thereafter. Attempting to determine the existence of causation by use of the conventional
"but for" test yields an anomalous and indefensible result-neither the person responsible for the
first fire nor the one responsible for the second is liable for the plaintiffs loss of his house.
39. Where a person is just as likely to be injured by the course of action that they would
have pursued as by the changed course of action that they did pursue as a result of suffering the
initial injury, there should be no secondary liability. See Zuchowitz v. United States, 140 F.3d
381 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980);
Betancourt v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln Mercury Inc., 607 N.Y.S.2d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 411-12. Thus, suffering injury in an accident while in a
speeding ambulance is compensable, but injuries occurring during transport to the hospital either
in an ambulance proceeding normally or in a cab are both not compensable by the defendant that
caused the initial injury. Perhaps, the point can be made by a parable created by W. Somerset
Maugharn in his play Sheppey published in 1934:
Death said: There was a merchant in Baghdad who sent his servant to the market to
buy provisions and in a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and
said, Master, just now when I was in the market-place I was jostled by a woman in the
crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and
made a threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away from this
city and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me. The
merchant lent him his horse, and the servant mounted it, and he dug his spurs in its
flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant went down to
the market-place and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came to me and said,
Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you saw him this morn-
ing? That was not a threatening gesture, I said, it was only a start of surprise. I was
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other examples of such thought provoking notes are those raised in
connection with economic harm and egg shell plaintiff cases, when the
authors ask whether some plaintiffs should be expected to self-
insure.4"
Finally, the notes also provide key source material that provides a
good starting point for research. However, the authors manage to
avoid providing an undue clutter of sources.
In several respects, Franklin and Rabin's casebook provides a
wonderful and effective vehicle for teaching torts, particularly to first-
year students. The book develops important overarching themes
while effectively presenting a wide variety of specific tort doctrines.
The book also offers professors opportunities to sharpen students' le-
gal abilities. In Part I of this review, I will discuss the first case in
Franklin and Rabin's book and explain its usefulness in introducing
several themes that both are critical to understanding tort law and as-
sume a prominent place throughout the casebook. In Part II, I will fo-
cus on Franklin and Rabin's treatment of particular topics within the
field of torts. I will concentrate on the materials regarding four aspects
of negligence causes of action: duty to avoid exposing others to emo-
tional harm unaccompanied by physical injury, medical malpractice,
regulatory compliance, and proximate cause. I will also critique the
materials addressing products liability, intentional torts, defamation,
and privacy.4 In Part III, I will discuss the usefulness of the casebook
astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in
Samarra.
W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, SHEPPEY (1934).
The point of citing the story is to argue that if the actions plaintiff took in obtaining treat-
ment were no more risky than those he would take if he had not needed treatment, he might well
have been worse off. There is simply no way of knowing whether the negligent actor who in-
jured him in fact did him a favor by allowing him to avoid more serious injury or, in fact, placed
him in graver danger. Indeed, Rabin has observed that one difficulty in proving causation with
regard to toxic torts is the difficulty in proving that plaintiffs injury resulted from exposure to
the chemical rather than the background risks that everyone faces. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra
note 1, at 393-94.
40. I first discuss this with my students when addressing social host liability for injuries
caused by drunk drivers. Potential victims of drunk drivers can more precisely calibrate their
insurance needs than can social hosts who serve alcohol. However, deterrence considerations
favor imposing liability upon social hosts because they, at least, have some ability to prevent
drunk driving. Complicating the issue is the significant overlap between the pool of drivers who
have primary insurance to compensate them for injuries during car accidents and the pool of
homeowners who have liability insurance.
41. This review essay focuses predominant attention upon the casebook's coverage of ac-
tions vindicating individuals interests in their physical security, in particular, negligence, abso-
lute liability, strict products liability, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, because that is my focus in using the book to teach my one semester four-hour Torts
course. However, the casebook, of course, covers the conventional range of subjects encom-
passed by standard torts casebooks, including misrepresentation and nuisance.
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in imparting lawyering skills to first-year students-skills such as
thinking creatively about facts, appreciating the importance of devel-
oping facts, legal analysis, and appreciating the procedural posture of
cases.
I. HAMMONTREE V. JENNER: PREVIEWING THE MAJOR THEMES
OF TORTS COURSES
The text's first case, Hammontree v. Jenner,42 introduces the con-
ceptual framework underlying the first eight chapters addressing unin-
tentional torts. The case poses a conflict between two of the three ma-
jor liability regimes applicable to unintentional torts: negligence and
strict products liability. The court's ultimate resolution of the issue
before it turns on whether a driver's loss of control due to physical in-
capacitation should be addressed under a regime of negligence or strict
liability. The case provides a great introduction to legal analysis be-
cause the court offers two rationales for embracing negligence rather
than strict liability as the appropriate liability regime, leaving unclear
whether either of the reasons would alone suffice.43 Hammontree thus
provides an early opportunity to distinguish negligence, which re-
quires fault, strict products liability, which requires defect, and abso-
lute liability, which requires only harm and generally applies only to
abnormally dangerous activities." Ultimately, however, the true bril-
liance of introducing torts by using Hammontree v. Jenner is that the
case facilitates discussion of three major themes of a torts course: (1)
whether tort law is based on moral desert, often discussed in terms of
"corrective justice," or economic efficiency; (2) whether courts should
themselves change settled legal rules or instead await legislative action;
and (3) the relationship of tort law to "civil rights." I will discuss each
of these three themes in turn.
42. 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), excerpted in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1,
at 3-6. The choice of this case might seem odd, since this is one of the few state cases in the
casebook decided by a state intermediate appellate court.
43. I explore this problem by giving the students a hypothetical in which an individual who
makes and delivers cookies to retailers suffers a seizure while making his cookie deliveries. If the
principle of internalizing the cost of injuries to business provides an adequate ground for impos-
ing liability upon a product seller, then there is a strong argument for strict liability. If the
court's major concern was destabilizing liability rules regarding driving, then my hypothetical
cookie maker should be no more subject to strict liability than the defendant in Hammontree.
One could also argue that internalization of the cost is justified only with regard to unusual risks
a business poses. Thus, my hypothetical cookie maker should be no more subject to internaliza-
tion of the cost for risks caused by his modest amount of driving than should the defendant in
Hammontree. In contrast, a taxi company, whose business involves a greatly disproportionate
amount of driving, should be subject to strict liability.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 520 (1977).
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A. Major Tort Law Conceptual Frameworks: Law and Economics vs.
Corrective Justice
In Hammontree v. Jenner, the court adverts to various economics
concepts in explaining its decision to hold defendant to a negligence
standard rather than a strict liability standard. The authors supple-
ment the case with notes excerpting two classic works: Oliver Wendell
Holmes's The Common Law4 and Richard Posner's A Theory of Negli-
gence.46  The casebook thus introduces two major conceptual frame-
works for analyzing torts: the moral approach and the law and eco-
nomics approach. The selection from The Common Law captures the
moral approach: absolute liability is unfair and unduly limits individ-
ual freedom by imposing liability on people for harms they can only
prevent by refraining from acting altogether. By contrast, Posner's ar-
ticle invokes economic efficiency in arguing for a negligence standard;
in Posner's view, a negligence standard will most likely produce the
optimal level of safety. A case that has captured students' imagination
and provides a dramatic device for contrasting the two approaches to
torts is the highly publicized damage award to a New Mexico woman
who received severe burns after spilling a cup of McDonald's coffee.47
I analyze the plaintiffs claim first from the perspective of moral desert
and then from that of law and economics. I suggest that while the ap-
proach one adopts clearly determines the questions one asks, neither
approach necessarily compels any particular conclusion. 4' I revisit
these contrasting approaches regularly during the semester, though
more frequently and rigorously toward the end of the semester after
spending some weeks focusing on fundamental tort doctrine and basic
legal analysis.
49
The casebook's material on economics, presented in its most
concentrated form in the "theoretical perspective" section of the abso-
45. Franklin & Rabin, supra note 1, at 6 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 94-96 (1881)).
46. Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 33 (1972).
47. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc, No CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(Bemadillo Cty. Cal. Aug. 18, 1994). The controversial position Consumer Products Safety
Commission member Mary Sheila Gall took with regard to the tipping hazard of baby bath seats,
Lizette Alvarez, Democrats Reject Bush's Choice to Head Product Safety Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2001, at Al, provides a more recent dramatic device that can be used to outline the contrasting
philosophical perspectives on torts.
48. Much of what I say appears in an unpublished manuscript. Bernard W. Bell, Did
Somebody Say McDonald's?: Hot Coffee, Corrective Justice, Efficient Compensation Schemes, and
First-year Torts (unpublished manuscript, on file with Seattle University Law Review).
49. Id. at 6-9 (exploring contexts in which I discuss the contrasting perspectives on tort
law). The authors note these contrasting approaches when covering the law of nuisance, a topic
that, given time constraints, I do not broach in class. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 674-
77.
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lute liability chapter, explicates the economic analysis of tort law quite
well, but may prove a bit opaque for students who lack some econom-
ics background. The authors have made the basic economic analysis
somewhat easier to understand in the Seventh Edition by substituting
a "translation" of Guido Calabresi's leading work, The Cost of Acci-
dents, for excerpts from the original Calabresi work itself.5" Neverthe-
less, perhaps a basic primer on economics is in order in the section.
Though, in light of their no doubt pressing space concerns, perhaps
the authors have decided that professors concerned about their stu-
dents' ability to grasp the economics can assign more basic economics
material independently.
However, the authors do not focus sufficiently on trenchant chal-
lenges to the assumptions underlying the standard economic analysis
of tort law,5' though they make a bit more of an effort to do so in the
newest edition. An excerpted 1996 article by Joseph H. King, Jr. dis-
cusses some critiques of conventional economic analysis.5 2 Even King,
however, only hints at the fairly powerful challenge cognitive psychol-
ogy poses for classical economics. Scholarship in the field of cognitive
psychology suggests the deeply flawed nature of the law and econom-
ics assumption that consumers behave rationally in purchasing and us-
ing products. Cognitive psychologists have found that in making de-
cisions people typically do not engage in sophisticated cost-benefit
analysis, but rather unconsciously rely on analytical shortcuts, de-
nominated "heuristics." Such heuristics, cognitive psychologists ar-
gue, reflect biases that unconsciously lead people to make identifiable
systematic mistakes. For example, people tend to overestimate very
small risks, like the risk of an airplane crash or the risk of death from
attack by a man-eating animal, and underestimate substantial risks,
50. In particular, the authors excerpt Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to
Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 349-61 (1996).
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 525-31. This replaces the excerpted version of Guido
Calabresi's THE COST OF ACcIDENTS (1970) that has appeared in previous editions.
51. A minor point in this regard is the failure to provide a critique of the accepted internali-
zation of the cost and spreading of the cost rationales for strict products liability set forth in
Escola. For instance, one might argue that such an approach produces two untoward conse-
quences. First, the approach skews investment in products toward safety and away from other
desirable product qualities. Second, the "internalization" approach may affect the willingness of
the public to invest in businesses selling products rather than in consumption because the cost of
investing includes not only the cost of raw materials and labor, but also encompasses funding for
a system of social insurance to ensure that everyone injured by products is compensated, regard-
less of the manufacturer's lack of fault-a system of social insurance that, in the judiciary's
judgment, provides the best method for spreading the cost of injuries to the larger society. Jus-
tice Kane's dissent in Shepard v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Kane,
J., dissenting), provides a cogent yet short exposition of that position. The new edition does this
somewhat, again by way of the King excerpt. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 529.
52. Id. at 530-31; King, supra note 50.
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like the risk some commonly used product will cause injury. The cog-
nitive psychology based critique may suggest a different approach to
at least the following two questions: (1) whether consumers should be
given the choice to use certain dangerous products; and (2) whether
the costs of certain undesirable consumer behavior should be internal-
ized to consumers."3 I raise these issues by assigning excepts from an
article by Howard Latin, in which he uses cognitive psychology to at-
tack a proposal for the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability regarding use of warnings about product dangers in lieu
of product redesign to eliminate the danger.5 4
The authors allude to, but make little of, a third approach: the
critical perspective. Critical scholars argue that tort law merely re-
flects the needs of dominant economic forces. In a note following
Brown v. Kendall, the authors quote a passage from an article by
Charles 0. Gregory. Gregory suggests that Chief Justice Shaw, Brown
v. Kendall's author, embraced a negligence standard and discarded the
then traditional strict liability regime because he wished to further the
interests of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs' investments might have
been threatened by liability for industrial accidents.5
The authors make little of such a "critical legal theory" approach
throughout the remainder of the book. However, solicitude for pow-
53. If consumers are not calculating decision-makers, forcing them to bear the costs of their
own poor decisions will not reduce injuries.
54. Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1193 (1994). The article discusses the question of whether warnings can substitute for
making safety enhancing design changes in a product. Latin notes that RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS section 402A comment j presumed that reasonable people would consis-
tently heed warnings, that a 1993 tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY suggested that consumers should be permitted to chose their own level of risk prefer-
ence, and that allowing warnings to substitute for design changes effectuates such consumer
choice. See id. at 1205-06 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT
LIABILITY 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1993)). Using cognitive psychology, Latin argues that
both approaches were flawed because consumer and user choice will not reflect their actual fully
considered preferences, but heuristic mistakes, inter alia, which will lead them to make non-
optimal choices that do not reflect their preferences. Id. at 1203-07, 1229-42. Of course, since
manufacturer's may be subject to these same cognitive biases, Latin must argue that manufactur-
ers can more easily avoid such biases. Such an assumption certainly seems reasonable.
Moreover, decision-makers exercising governmental power, such as juries, judges, and
administrative agencies, may act under the influences of the same biases. Some work exploring
this problem has already been done. E.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Edward
J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA.
L. REV. 1341, 1345-46 (1995) ("at a minimum, that legal scholars and others should pay more
attention to cognitive effects on pain and suffering damages, so that society can respond more
actively to choices made under the influence of cognitive tendencies").
55. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 37 (citing Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negli-
gence toAbsolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 368 (1951)).
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erful economic interests is sometimes evident in the cases and doc-
trines set out in the book. A "critical" perspective on tort law might
explain the courts' unusual solicitude toward utility companies, which
has resulted in holdings that: (1) power companies have limited legal
liabilities for grossly negligent conduct that produces massive power
failures; 6 and (2) water companies have no liability for negligently
failing to fulfill contractual obligations to provide fire departments
with water for fighting fires. 7 A critical approach might also explain
tort law's unusual solicitude toward medical doctors and other profes-
sionals. Medical doctors are rarely held liable in strict products liabil-
ity when the products they provide prove defective in ways that physi-
cally injure patients, while service providers in less prestigious
professions are more often found liable under strict products liability
in such situations.5 8 Such an approach could also explain the greater
protection accorded interests in real property than interests in physical
integrity in Rylands v. Fletcher. Land provided an important basis of
wealth and status in mid-Nineteenth Century England, when Rylands
v. Fletcher was decided. In Rylands, the court attempts, with quite
limited success, to justify its decision to allow landowners to assert ab-
solute liability claims for unintentional invasions of property even
though people venturing into public places could only assert negli-
gence causes of actions against those who unintentionally cause them
physical injury. 9
B. Institutional Analysis: The Respective Capacities of Courts and
Legislators
Hammontree v. Jenner also illustrates a judicial dilemma that re-
appears repeatedly: should courts themselves modernize outdated tort
doctrines to address new developments or instead leave such decisions
56. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985).
57. Moch v. Rensaleer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
58. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 632-35 (citing Royer v. Catholic Med.
Ctr. 741 A.2d 74 (N.H. 1999)). Indeed, solicitude toward high status groups may provide an
alternative explanation for the professional standard of care that allow professions to set their
own safety standards. Ryan v. New York Central Railroad, 35 N.Y. 210 (1866), in which the
New York Court of Appeals dramatically limits the liability of railroad companies for the fire
damage caused by the operation of their trains, may also suggest the cogency of a critical
perspective on tort law.
59. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 501. Interestingly, the authors quote Turner v.
Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936), a 1936 case in which the Texas Supreme Court
refused to apply Rylands v. Fletcher and held that the escape of impounded water does not occa-
sion strict liability for the damage it subsequently causes because, given the arid nature of West
Texas, such a rule would mean that "the great livestock industry of West Texas must perish."
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 505-06. The concern for dominant economic interests is
quite near the surface in the part of the opinion that Franklin and Rabin quote.
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to legislative consideration.6" If the counter-majoritarian difficulty
plagues constitutional law, 61 something of a non-majoritarian diffi-
culty should perhaps cause at least some concern in common law
fields. While courts deciding tort cases do not invalidate legislation,
they nevertheless change settled legal rules to better reflect societal
values. 62
As elective bodies, legislatures presumably reflect the will of the
electorate; courts make policy judgments but lack a similar democratic
pedigree. Granted, in many states, at least some judges undergo some
sort of electoral judgment, 63 but those elections generally provide
60. These issues were explored by scholars and judges in a recent symposium. Sympo-
sium, Judges As Tort Lawmakers, Fifth Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy,
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 275 (1999). As a practical matter, since no court always chooses one of the
options, the question is really when, not whether, courts should act themselves rather than await
legislative action..
In this connection, I find it at least helpful to introduce first-year students to the issue of
whether a judicial ruling should be prospective only and the traditional assumption that case law
applies retroactively. Franklin and Rabin do not say much about this issue, so I provide a short
summary of the law in this area. More could be done with the point, particularly if the course is
being taught to students who have taken or are currently taking Constitutional Law, because
then one could delve into the separations of powers arguments with regard to the importance of
making judicial decisions retroactive. See Bernard W. Bell, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78
TEX. L. REV. 235, 246 n.88, 258 n.145 (1999) (citing sources).
61. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-6 (3d ed. 2000);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-7, at 10-12 (2d ed. 1988); see
also Bernard W. Bell, Byron R. White, Kennedy Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1381 n.65 (1999)
(book review) (citing sources).
62. Indeed, there might be a legislative acquiescence argument that the legislature has
placed its imprimatur on tort law doctrines by failing to modify those decisions. See WILLIAM
POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 623-28 (3d ed. 2000); cf Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Acquiescence arguments have been used only sparingly in interpreting statutes, and even
there that method of interpretation has come under heavy attack. An acquiescence argument is
even more difficult to make in common law area where legal doctrines are not based on constru-
ing statutes initially enacted by legislatures.
The obverse can also pose an interesting problem: sometimes the courts have to decide whether
the legislature, by acting in a common law area, has deprived the court of common law power to
further develop the common law. See generally Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513
(Wis. 1970).
63. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (1995) ("[in only twelve states are most judges not electorally ac-
countable to the citizenry"); Edward A. Hartnett, Why is the Supreme Court of the United States
Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 977 n.372 (1997) (chroni-
cling Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other members of the California Supreme Court who were
voted out of office and noting that within the previous decade, judges had been turned out of
office in North Carolina, New Mexico, West Virginia, and Wyoming). The analysis in the text
focuses on judges of the highest state courts, which are often the only courts that can change es-
tablished legal principles.
However, we are somewhat ambivalent about judicial election, see Chisom v. Roemer, 501
U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (noting "[tlhe fundamental tension between the ideal character of judicial
office and the real world of electoral politics"), and the legal community worries about the effect
of such elections on judicial independence. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the
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judges with little status as democratic representatives of their "con-
stituents."" Judges enjoy unusually long "terms of office" between
elections. Courts are small bodies and thus cannot claim to be as rep-
resentative as legislative bodies, which are typically much larger.6"
Due to the nature of the judicial task, only lawyers, a relatively small
segment of the population, possess the qualifications for such offices.
Finally, judicial elections fundamentally differ from other elections
because judges must remain impartial; in judicial elections, candidates
cannot make meaningful substantive commitments regarding their ex-
ercise of official powers if elected.66 For all these reasons, standing for
elections does not make judges particularly good representatives of
their fellow citizens' political preferences, or even their values.
67
Consequently, judges must justify, in ways the legislators need
not, the value judgments upon which they rely in crafting common
law doctrine. Judges typically seek some external point of reference in
deriving such values, and that imperative forces courts to confront the
question of which external reference points provide appropriate bases
for the value judgments underlying their decisions. So, courts must
consider the sources from which they derive the value judgments they
Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Un-
popular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997); Mario M. Cuomo, Some Thoughts on Judicial
Independence, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 298 (1997).
Moreover, judges even run differently than other elected officials. ABA MODEL CANONS
OF ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (candidates for judicial office should not "make pledges or promises
of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office"),
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(iii) (candidates for judicial office shall not "knowingly misrepresent the iden-
tity, qualifications, present position or any other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent");
see also In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 42 (2000) ("We agree that the state's interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of the judiciary supports the imposition of greater restrictions on a candidate's
speech during a campaign for judicial office than is permissible in other campaigns."); Randall
T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1059, 1067-68 (1996) (speech of judicial candidates is an issue that is prompting controversy and
litigation); Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 2000),
vacated, 2001 WL 920672 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2001); Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1337
(N.D. Ga. 2000).
64. Chisom, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (addressing question of whether elected judges are "repre-
senatives" for purposes of the Voting Rights Act).
65. State courts of last resort rarely have more than nine members. Even though there are
more state court appellate and trial judges on the various courts of a state, they generally sit ei-
ther alone or in small panels. Moreover, unlike most state legislators, state supreme court jus-
tices often run "at large" rather than in "single-member" districts, which arguably further re-
duces the representativeness of the court.
66. ABA MODEL CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (candidates for judicial office
should not "make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office").
67. Indeed, legislators and even chief executives are representatives because they often have
continuing relationships with their constituents in ways that judges do not. Citizen lobbying of
judges is far more constrained than citizen lobbying of legislative and executive branch officials.
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rely upon in making policy decisions that change liability rules. Tara-
soff v. Regent of the University of California and Kelly v. Gwinne168 offer
good examples of cases in which courts somewhat self-consciously
grapple with these issues.69 However, I remind students that the set-
tled rules themselves are judicially created and reflect the value judg-
ments of the jurists that established those rules. Thus, if we question
the legitimacy of judicial modification or abandonment of established
law, we must also question the legitimacy of the established law itself,
as both share the same jurisprudential foundations.
Courts must confront questions of institutional competence
when deciding whether they should change settled legal rules or await
legislative action. Courts and legislatures possess very different at-
tributes, and sometimes analysis of the institutions' respective
strengths and weaknesses may suggest the need for judicial restraint.
Hammontree v. Jenner illustrates judicial concerns regarding institu-
tional competence, and is one of the rare cases in which a court explic-
itly relies on such institutional competence concerns in staying its
hand.7" Courts proceed on a case-by-case basis and possess limited
power to anticipate issues not presented in actual cases.7 They are, in
a sense, reactive and very dependent on the litigants that appear before
them. Litigants both drive most courts' agendas and supply the "leg-
islative facts" critical in many landmark cases.72 The court found such
institutional limitations significant in Hammontree because if it over-
turned settled law, it would lack the capacity to establish precise and
comprehensive new rules to replace them. The court considered such
instability particularly troubling because its ruling would affect the
68. In the seventh edition, Kelly v. Gwinnel has been replaced by an even more recent social
host case: Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash. 2d 491, 951 P.2d 761 (1998), in FRANKLIN & RABIN,
supra note 1, 185-89.
69. This is also an issue in Strauss v. Belle Realty, where resolution of the issue seems to
have less of an "objective" basis (i.e., a basis external to the judges own preferences). FRANKLIN
& RABIN, supra note 1, at 144-48.
70. Bell, supra note 60, at 261 (citing cases and scholarly discussion); see also Hillerby v.
Town of Colchester, 706 A.2d 446 (Vt. 1997) (refusing to change the rules of municipal immu-
nity so as to "give the [1legislature the initial opportunity to fashion a more reasonable and
workable doctrine" because "[i]ts fact-finding and problem-solving process is better suited for
the task").
71. Given judges' ability to use dicta, courts are not entirely powerless to anticipate issues.
72. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis popularized the distinction between legislative facts and
adjudicative or historical facts. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5, at 140-149 (1994)). As Davis and Pierce explain:
"Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, [and]
with what motive or intent [and] are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case.
Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which [sic]
help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." Id., at 141; see KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3 (2d ed. 1979).
[Vol. 25:1
2001] The Wide World of Torts
law governing automobile accident claims, and such unstable legal
principles might undermine the efficacy of the system of informal set-
tlement of such claims.73 These questions regarding institutional
competence and the source of the judge's value judgments frequently
recur in the materials on unintentional torts, particularly the materials
that explore the duty element of negligence causes of action.74
However, the authors also miss important opportunities to make
legal process points. 75 For instance, the authors excerpt Indiana Har-
bor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., where a court consid-
ers whether a shipper should be held absolutely liable for damage
caused by the spill of a hazardous chemical from a freight train. The
authors do not note that some states and two federal agencies began to
address the question of hazardous waste sites by application of princi-
ples of absolute liability. Moreover, following the Love Canal crisis,
76
Congress preempted such common law developments by enacting the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA),7" thus establishing an administrative sys-
73. See also Bell, supra note 60, at 259 n.150, 261 n.160 (citing sources). But see FRANKLIN
& RABIN, supra note 1, at 772-73 (citing H.L. ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 237-40 (1980)). Ross's book describes insur-
ance adjusters' practices in settling automobile accident claims. He finds that the adjusters had
developed rules to settle liability claims, but that the adjusters' rules were much less nuanced
than the legal principles set forth in the applicable case law. This suggests that most accident
claims are not resolved in the way courts would resolve them (and thus that a change in liability
rules would not have the effects the judges in Hamontree feared). Nevertheless, the adjusters'
simplified rules are based on settled court precedent about responsibilities in automobile acci-
dents even though it may oversimplify them.
74. Among the cases in which this issue of institutional competence arises are Kelly v.
Gwinell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (liability of social hosts), Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482
N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985) (liability of electric utility to those injured during city-wide blackout),
and Hymonowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (liability of pharmaceutical
manufacturers on basis of market share liability). The authors tend to radically excerpt the dis-
sents in such cases, and tend to excise dissenters' assertions that adoption of novel principles is
most appropriate left to the legislature.
75. The term "legal process" refers to the study of the comparison between the manner in
which various governmental institutions address social problems. See HENRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (1994) (prepared for publication from the 1958 Tentative Edition by
William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey ). Admittedly the materials on alternatives to the tort
system do require students to consider the relative merits of administrative agencies and courts in
resolving social problems. The authors discuss workers' compensation and no-fault automobile
insurance at length and compensation schemes for vaccination or medical malpractice more
briefly, but the focus is on providing compensation for injuries, not intervening to reduce the risk
of injury in the first place.
76. For a recent, brief description of the Love Canal crisis, see Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691-98 (1999).
77. Superfund Act, Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
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tem for preventing and remedying the environmental degradation
caused by hazardous waste disposal.7"
The authors miss another legal process opportunity when they
present two classic railroad crossing cases: Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Co. v. Goodman and Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. The dangers of
such crossings could be addressed haphazardly through tort litigation
brought by injured motorists. Courts could resolve such cases by em-
ploying either of two contributory negligence approaches: application
of a very amorphous reasonableness standard of conduct, typified by
Pokora, or application of precise rules that often lead to problematic
results, typified by Goodman.9 However, Congress has supplemented
the tort system by enacting statutes that empower federal agencies to
proactively improve safety at railroad crossings. Congress's approach
involved creating general standards, systematically canvassing the
needs at each grade crossing, and providing federal funding to pur-
chase warning devices and other safety improvements." State courts
78. See 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
§ 13.06[6], at 13-17-13-18 (Sheldon M. Novck et al. Eds. 1994); News and Analysis Comment,
Hazardous Waste, EPA: Justice Invokes Emergency Authority, Common Law in Litigation Cam-
paign Against Dump Sites, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034 (1980); see also In Defense of Retroactive
Laws, at 253; State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983). Granted,
considerably after the chapter on absolute liability, the authors do mention a proposal made
around the time that CERCLA was enacted to create a no-fault compensation scheme for per-
sonal injuries due to disposition of hazardous substances. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at
845-47.
79. This pair of cases provide an early opportunity to highlight the distinction between
rules and standards and spark student consideration of the relative merits of precise rules and
vague standards. Of course, one of the classic contests between proponents of rules and propo-
nents of standards is the debate between Judges Cardozo and Andrews in Pasgraf. See Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01, 103-04 (N.Y. 1928). Cardozo, for the majority,
announces a rule for determining proximate cause issues when an actor's conduct unexpectedly
harms a person. Cardozo's test turns on the existence of foreseeability. Judge Andrews, on the
dissenters' behalf, argues that the proximate cause inquiry cannot be reduced to a rule, but rather
must be governed by a standard encompassing several factors that must be weighed in the
unique factual circumstances of individual cases.
In their selection of cases and discussion of various torts principles, the authors capture the
progression of tort law doctrine from the predominance of rules to the ascendency of standards.
Professor James A. Henderson discusses this trend in tort law at length in James A. Henderson,
Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
The relative merits of rules and standards have implications far beyond the subject of torts. See
generally Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive The-
ory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1310-13 (2000); Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation
Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 199-205
(1999).
80. Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-440, tit. II, 108 Stat. 4619 (1994);
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971 (1970) (49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq. (1994))
(original statute now repealed).
Perhaps most glaringly, the casebook briefly discusses the application of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress cause of action on credit collection practices without mentioning
the Federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a-1692o (1994), which
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resolving negligence claims could not have crafted such a comprehen-
sive approach.
In their new edition, the authors have added two cases that ex-
plore new dimensions of legal process. One new case, Uhr v. East
Greenbush Central School District," raises for the first time a legal
process question that arises in many contexts. Uhr anchors a new dis-
cussion of implied rights of action. In Uhr, the New York Court of
Appeals considered whether it should imply a right of action to en-
force a state statute requiring school districts to test all eight- to six-
teen-year-old students for scoliosis annually. The plaintiff developed
scoliosis, which might have been treated before causing him perma-
nent injury had the school district conducted the legislatively man-
dated testing. The exposure to implied rights of action on the state
level is particularly helpful because, even if students study the concept
of implied rights of action later in their law school careers during, for
example, Federal Courts, Administrative Law, or Legislation, they
will almost invariably be asked to focus upon federal, not state, Juris-
prudence." Moreover, raising the concept of implied rights of action
during Torts forces the students to consider the unique role of courts
in tort actions. Reticence about implying rights of action seems par-
ticularly odd with regard to tort law because, unlike in many areas of
law, the courts unquestionably possess common law powers to create
new actions. Thus, an emphasis on effectuating some inchoate legisla-
tive intent regarding creation of a cause of action may make sense in
areas, such as environmental law or securities law, where the courts
lack common law power, but not with regard to tort law.
One might also ask students why a legislature would create a
right without providing a judicial remedy. Perhaps the possible rea-
sons for legislative denial of remedies resemble the reasons courts cite
Federal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, IS U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a-1692o (1994), which
more precisely regulates the practices of bill collectors and provides statutory civil damages
remedies.
81. 720 N.E.2d 886 (N.Y. 1999); see also FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 237-42 (cit-
ing Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000)) (New York City medical exam-
iner's breach of statutory duty to provide accurate information to authorities regarding deceased
individuals cause of death does not provide plaintiff with a damages cause of action to vindicate
his interest in not being wrongly suspected of murder).
82. For instance, William Popkin's MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION addresses implied
rights of action, but only on the federal level. POPKIN, supra note 62, at 706-25. The same is
true of the latest edition of HENRY MELVIN HART ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 829-46 (Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1996) and for JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUB-
LIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1122-50 (4th ed. 1998). Though the issue also
arises in some substantive courses, like environmental law or securities regulation, the focus is
again likely to be on federal court caselaw.
2001]
Seattle University Law Review
when refusing to recognize certain obligations as legally enforceable
duties whose breach gives rise to tort liability. Strauss v. Belle Realty3
and Riss v. City of New York 4 provide ready examples of such judicial
decisions. In Strauss, Consolidated Edison clearly had statutory obli-
gations to provide electric power, and in Riss, the Police Department
surely had obligations to protect citizens.8" However, in each case, the
New York Court of Appeals decided to refrain from enforcing those
duties in tort actions, at least when the actions were brought by certain
victims.86
A second case, McDermott v. Reynolds,87 illustrates the difficul-
ties courts confront in defining the contours of state statutes that abro-
gate certain categories of tort claims. In particular, the Virginia courts
recognize the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,8 but
the state legislature had enacted an "anti-heart balm"8 9 statute that ab-
rogated causes of action for "alienation of affection, breach of a prom-
ise to marry, and criminal conversation," causes of action based on
third party interference with couples' intimate relationships.9" A hus-
band whose wife had been unfaithful sued his wife's paramour for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. He alleged that the public
flaunting of the relationship had caused the couple's children and him-
self extreme humiliation. The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that such an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, though not abolished by name in the statute, nevertheless fell
within the statute's scope.9" The gravemen of plaintiffs intentional
83. 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985)
84. 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968)
85. Surely a police officer who unreasonably failed to respond to citizens in need of help
could be officially reprimanded or dismissed for dereliction of duty. See Kevin Flynn, 9 Police
Officers Facing Discipline in Park Attacks, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 2000, at Al (quoting Police
Commissioner Howard Safir as saying: "Police officers who ignore or brush off a plea for help
violate their oath to this city, and deserve severe and decisive punishment."). Indeed, in discuss-
ing Riss v. New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968), a professor might put the case into a larger
context in which there are persistent assertions that police provide less protection to some mem-
bers of the public than to others.
86. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985) (electric utility has no duty of
care to people who may be injured in blackouts but are not in privity with the electric utility);
Riss, 240 N.E.2d 860 (for purposes of negligence actions, municipalities have no duty of care to
those who seek their protection from criminal assaults).
87. 530 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 2000).
88. Indeed, a case discussing the elements of the tort in Virginia, Womack v. Eldridge, 210
S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974), appears in the casebook a few pages before McDermott.
89. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1135
(10th ed. 2000); H. CLARKE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 267 (1968).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220. (2000).
91. Interestingly, the legislature did not add a more general term at the end of the list, such
as "and similar actions," and it is possible that the Virginia courts had already recognized a cause
of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the statute was enacted.
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infliction of emotional distress claim was indistinguishable from that
of the listed causes of action that the statute had explicitly abolished.
One of the notes following the case summarizes a somewhat contrast-
ing New Jersey case finding that the state's "anti-heart balm" statute
permits a husband's claim against his wife and her lover. The lover
had fathered two children with the wife, not disclosed the relationship,
and allowed the husband to raise and support the children without any
assistance as if they were the husband's own.92
One final legal process observation warrants note. Increasingly,
executive officials of the federal government, state governments, and
municipalities use the tort system to vindicate the public interest by
bringing suits in the name of their respective governments to impose
liability on companies in ways that will alter their behavior.93 The
cigarette cases brought by the state attorneys general and by the
United States as well as the litigation commenced by cities against
firearms manufacturers provide paradigmatic examples of this type of
litigation.94 Executive Branch officials proceed by litigation because
they have failed to convince the appropriate legislative bodies, either
the ones of their own jurisdictions or those of more geographically-
extensive jurisdictions, to take action. The appropriate legislative
bodies refused to act precisely because of the unresolved political con-
troversies regarding regulation of those products.95 The executive of-
ficials are thus essentially seeking to regulate through instituting litiga-
tion that raises the specter of truly massive liabilities.
The irony inherent in regulation by litigation is apparent in the
tobacco litigation brought by state attorneys general. Just last term,
the United States Supreme Court, in Food & Drug Administration v.
Brown & Williamson,96 precluded the Food and Drug Administration
92. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 904-05 (citing C.M. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999)).
93. The federal government's lawsuit is described in United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116
F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000). The prosecution of the lawsuit itself has been a matter of politi-
cal controversy. See Marc Kaufman & Dan Eggen, U.S. to Seek Settlement in Tobacco Suit,
WASH. POST, June 20, 2001, at Al; David Johnston, In Shift, U.S. Opens Effort to Settle To-
bacco Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at Al.
94. Indeed, more generally, juries are using tort verdicts to compel public and private enti-
ties to change their conduct. See generally Mark Curriden, The Power of 12, ABA JOURNAL,
Aug. 2001, at 36 (noting several cases involving major public policy questions that Congress and
state legislatures have failed to address and reporting that some legal analysts believe that "the 12
people in the jury box are frequently identifying with activists and issuing verdicts that they be-
lieve will lead to change").
95. Indeed, with regard to potential gun manufacturer liability, some state legislatures have
gone further and prohibited cities from suing firearms manufacturers except for breach of con-
tract or warranty for guns purchased by the city. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184(b)(2)
(1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 128.001 (1999).
96. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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(the FDA) from promulgating regulations regarding tobacco products,
even though the FDA found that the manufacturers intended ciga-
rettes to have pharmacological effects. The Court had concluded that
Congress had, over the years, deliberately retained for itself the power
to specify tobacco manufacturers legal obligations.97 However, state
courts have approved settlement of tobacco litigation brought by state
attorneys general9" even though that settlement has regulatory aspects.
For example, Section III of the Multi-State Master Settlement Agree-
ment (MSA), entitled "Permanent Relief," specifies many limitations
on both the marketing of cigarette products and cigarette companies
promotion of events. 99 State attorneys general surely possess much
less authority than the FDA to regulate the advertising and sale of to-
bacco. Indeed, Congress refused the opportunity to enact legislation
approving a similar settlement shortly before the MSA was finally
signed. 0
In short, tort law provides an opportunity to explore in some de-
tail the respective roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government.
C. Civil Rights Perspective
Teaching torts provides an opportunity to discuss "civil rights."
The Franklin and Rabin casebook provides an opportunity to consider
97. Id. at 156 ("Congress has persistently acted to preclude a meaningful role for any ad-
ministrative agency in making policy on the subject of tobacco and health"); see also id. at 149-
50, 154. The Court quoted the legislative history of a 1980 statute reversing a district court deci-
sion holding that the Consumer Product Safety Commission had the authority to regulate to-
bacco. The relevant senate report stated that the bill's purpose was to "unmistakably reaffirm
the clear mandate of the Congress that the basic regulation of tobacco and tobacco products is
governed by the legislation dealing with the subject .... and that any further regulation in this
sensitive and complex area must be reserved for specific [c]ongressional action." Id. at 150.
98. Multistate Master Settlement Agreement, available at
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/Extra/multistatesettlement.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
The MSA is analyzed in The Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc., The Multistate Master Set-
tlement Agreement and the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Selected Top-
ics and Provisions of the Multistate Master Agreement of November 23, 1998 (Mar. 24, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/ [hereinafter Multistate Master Settlement Analysis).
99. Interestingly, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 bars any "requirement
imposed under state law... with respect to the advertising or promotion" of cigarettes. How-
ever, in 1992, the United States Supreme Court had found that the statute did not preempt some
state common law causes of action premised on cigarette manufacturers' conduct in marketing
their products. Cipallone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
100. The state attorneys general and the United States Attorney General had entered into
an agreement with the tobacco companies contingent upon congressional approval of the settle-
ment. A bill approving the settlement was killed in the Senate. Thereafter, the state attorneys
general and the tobacco companies entered into the MSA, which the signatories did not make
contingent on congressional approval. Multistate Master Settlement Analysis, supra note 98, at 5-
7.
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the "civil rights" implications of tort law in several contexts, though
the authors do not highlight this feature of their materials.
Hammontree v. Jenner provides a starting point for such discus-
sion. Often, at least a few students will question whether the defen-
dant in Hammontree should have been allowed to drive at all, arguing
that state Departments of Motor Vehicles should err on the side of
caution in deciding whether to license epileptics. However, accepting
the plaintiff's claim that defendant be held strictly liable for the inju-
ries resulting from his sudden, unexpected incapacitation would se-
verely limit the basic rights of the disabled to remain integrated in so-
ciety.'' In other words, the plaintiffs approach would seem at odds
with the policies underlying the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),102 which attempts to maximize integration of the handicapped
in society."' Indeed, the ADA is premised on the principle that the
handicapped have long lacked sufficient opportunities to integrate
themselves into the life of the society.0 4 The Act emphasizes reason-
able accommodation0 s and individual consideration 10 6 rather than ex-
cessive caution and reliance upon stereotypes.
101. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54
CAL. L. REV. 841, 841 (1966) ("nothing could be more essential to personality, social existence,
economic opportunity-in short, to individual well-being and integration into the life of the
community-than... the public approval, and the legal right to be abroad in the land").
102. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1994) ("[tlo the maximum extent appropriate," the services must
be provided in a setting allowing the child to be educated with children that do not have disabili-
ties).
104. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I), at 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 268
("[tlhe Americans With Disabilities Act ... will permit the United States to take a long-delayed
but very necessary step to welcome individuals with disabilities fully into the mainstream of
American society); see also Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Pub. L. 91-230,
tit. VI, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (1970) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (1994)); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975); Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. 88-164, as added Pub. L. 98-527, § 2, 98 Stat. 2662,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1994)) (The Congress finds that ... the goals of the nation prop-
erly include the goal of providing individuals with developmental disabilities with the opportuni-
ties and support to ... achieve full integration and inclusion in society, in an individualized
manner, consistent with unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabili-
ties of each individual).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (ADA) (defining "reasonable accommodation"); 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" to include any person
who, with or without reasonable modifications of policies and practices, meets the essential eligi-
bility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities pro-
vided by a public entity); JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 37 (5th ed.
1995) (discussing reasonable accommodation in the context of housing).
106. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8) (1994)
(requiring that the local school authorities develop and act in conforming with an individualized
education plan (IEP) tailored to the needs of the particular disabled student); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (1995) (The determination that an individual poses a "direct threat" shall be based on
an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential
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Moreover, the plaintiff's approach would probably be applied in
a way that unequally limits citizen's ability to drive and thus fully par-
ticipate in society. Society might well impose strict liability upon
those afflicted with epilepsy, accurately perceived as a relatively small
group. However, such strict liability would almost certainly not be
imposed upon those with a family history of heart trouble. Heart dis-
ease is much more prevalent than epilepsy and imposing strict liability
on drivers who suffer heart attacks would inhibit so many people that
such drivers would possess sufficient political clout to successfully ob-
ject. 10
7
An appreciation of the civil rights of the handicapped has rele-
vance to the issue of considering mental disabilities when applying the
reasonable person standard. Well-settled case law provides that juries
must take into account an actor's physical disabilities when applying
the reasonable person standard, but not the actor's mental disabili-
ties.10 8 The passage of time has seriously eroded the rationales for dis-
regarding mental disabilities. For example, limited knowledge of both
the etiology of mental illness and the capabilities of the mentally ill has
been offered as one justification for refusing to modify the reasonable
person standard to account for mental illness.1"9 While our knowledge
of mental illness remains far from perfect, it has surely advanced
greatly since 1616, when the rule was established, or even since the
1960's, when the American Law Institute (ALI) promulgated the rele-
vant Restatement (Second) provisions. Indeed, we now know quite a
bit about at least some mental illnesses. In fact, we probably know as
much about some mental illnesses as we know about the capabilities of
children-whose limited abilities are taken into account in applying the
reasonable person standard. Moreover, the statutory context has
changed radically since the 1960s in ways that suggest that mental dis-
abilities should receive the same treatment accorded physical disabili-
functions of the job.); see also Tamara J. Weinstein, Equal Educational Opportunities for Learning
Deficient Students, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 500, 505-06 (2000); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act-Interpreting the Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 11-12 (1992) (discussing the need for individualized consideration when con-
sidering the "direct threat" issue under the ADA).
107. As of 1996, epilepsy afflicts 5.1 of every 1000 Americans, while 78.2 of every 1000
Americans suffers from heart disease. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL
AND HEALTH STATISTICS 82 (1996). Moreover, while the rate of epilepsy remains relatively
stable among older age groups, heart disease does not, affecting 116.4 of every 1000 Americans
between 45 and 64 and 268.7 of every 1000 Americans who are 65 and older. Id. Thus, even
those who do not suffer from heart disease during their youth have a significant chance of devel-
oping such a condition as they age.
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283B, 283C (1965). This is the rule if the
actor is an adult.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b. (1965).
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ties.' Thus, the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996"' provides that
mental illness should be treated like physical illness for purposes of in-
surance coverage, and in general, disability statutes do not distinguish
mental and physical disabilities. While neither the Mental Health
Parity Act nor the more general federal and state disability statutes di-
rectly apply to tort liability, surely those statues reflect a societal
judgment that the courts should respect in determining whether to jet-
tison legal principles established in 1616.112
Indeed, I have supplemented Franklin and Rabin's treatment of
the reasonable person standard in previous editions with great success.
I make use of a type of source that the authors rarely use as a primary
teaching device: The Restatement (Second) of Torts."' I teach the rea-
110. The Americans With Disabilities Act makes no distinction between physical and
mental disabilities, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994), and in the insurance context, mental
health parity laws are increasingly being enacted on a state and national level. See, e.g., Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §1185a (Supp. 1999)). Certainly the latter may reflect the diminution of the stigma that
society attaches to mental illness. For a general discussion of mental health parity legislation, see
Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the Emergence of Expansive Mental
Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8 (2000).
111. Pub.L. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §1185a
(Supp. 1999)).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b. (1965) (in the Middle Ages peo-
ple with mental disease were put on public display. See infra, note 114.) There is some reason
for caution. Every negligence case involves cognitive error, since the cases do not involve inten-
tional misconduct. Because cognitive error and mental disabilities both involve mental processes,
the line between the two may be particularly difficult to draw. For example, should a court mod-
ify the reasonable person standard to recognize attention deficit disorder?
Indeed, courts tend to have analogous problems in applying the Americans With Disabilities
Act and its precursors to the workplace. See Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989); see also
Karin Mika & Denise Wimbicus, Responsibilities of Employers Toward Mentally Disabled Persons
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 177-79 (1996-97). Is unde-
sirable behavior a personality trait that should be used as a basis for taking personnal actions or a
mental disability that must by law be accommodated? This problem produces debate even in the
psychiatric community. See id. at 174. One proposal to address this dilemma might also be
helpful for courts facing the issue of modifying the reasonable person standard---only docu-
mented mental illness can serve as a basis of a demand for accommodation (or for consideration
with regard to the actor's appropriate standard of conduct). Id. at 191.
113. The authors could perhaps present a broader array of sources as the principal materi-
als with regard to certain concepts. One such source is statutes. The authors do reprint a couple
of statutes as the principal material with regard to automobile "no fault" insurance and compara-
tive negligence. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 33 (1.981); see also FRANKLIN &
RABIN, supra note 1, at 441-44. However, neither of these statutes deals with basic substantive
liability. The problems they address will appear (at least to first-year students) to be largely ones
of calculating damages, which is hardly the focus of most first semester torts courses. Using a
statute that addresses the same issues as those addressed by case law might provide a more effec-
tive pedagogical tool. A products liability statute or a statute addressing social host liability
might prove viable candidates. In my first year, second semester Legislation course, I have stu-
dents analyze a model products liability statute drafted by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
MODEL UNIF. PRODS. LIAB. ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (United States Dep't of Commerce
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sonable person standard primarily through Restatement sections 283-
283C. I give the students an exercise in which one character who has a
mental disability, namely a developmental disability that leaves him
possessing the mental abilities of a 10-year-old child, and another who
has a physical disability, namely limited eyesight.114 Students must
resolve the case, involving a collision between golf carts driven by the
two characters, citing the Restatement for the principles they rely
upon. In addition to helping students learn black letter law, the exer-
cise provides an opportunity for creative lawyering. Arguably, the
mentally disabled character should be considered under the rule re-
garding children, given that his mental development can be equated
with that of a child,"' or even perhaps under the rule regarding physi-
cal handicaps, if there is organic brain disease." 6  The creative lawyer
can also argue that the absolute ban on considering mental disabilities
1979). I once tried leading my torts students through an analysis of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-2680
(1994)). The exercise did not work terribly well. Nevertheless, the FTCA is a possibility, and
one that might be very useful to students if they actually choose to practice in the torts area.
The Restatement could profitably be used as the focal point for materials in a section, given that
the Restatement provides black letter law as well as both explanations of the black-letter princi-
ples and the rationales for such principles. Model jury instructions might also be more promi-
nently featured. The authors do highlight a model jury instruction in the new edition,
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 41, but they do not use model jury instructions very often.
Model jury instructions and explanations will familiarize students with this source of information
that lawyers often use in practice in both tort and other types of cases.
The authors' preferred method seems to be the treatise, which in the sixth edition, they used
to cover the reasonable person standard and defenses to intentional tort actions. In the seventh
edition, they have switched to cases to cover the latter topic. Fortunately, the authors do not go
the route of including numerous cases but excerpting them so severely that only the statement of
the law is left. Thus, among other things, their book allows students to study techniques of legal
argumentation from masters like Cardozo and Traynor. Ybarra and McPherson provide particu-
larly fine examples of various modes of legal reasoning, but more contemporary cases like Tara-
soff and Kelly v. Gwinnell also provide good object lessons in legal reasoning.
114. I got the idea of the two characters from the movie Forrest Gump (Paramount Pictures
1994) and name my characters Ferris Gump and Dan Major.
115. Note, by the way, some of the reasons cited for ignoring mental illness also apply to
children. At the very least, imposing liability for children's failure to conduct themselves in ac-
cordance with the reasonable person standard will encourage more parental control. Granted,
people can more easily identify a child than a person suffering some mental illness, but it is not
clear that this can really sustain the weight of the distinction. Children are no doubt treated dif-
ferently because society places greater value on giving children freedom to be abroad in the land
even though they will not live up to the reasonable person standard.
116. Mika & Wimbicus, supra note 112, at 175 ("there are some organic disorders, such as
mental retardation and Alzheimer's disease, that are both physical and mental disabilities"). The
ease with which some deficiencies can be characterized in multiple ways is suggested for the first
time in the new edition. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 54-55 (Note 9) (discussing Bashi
v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The authors ask at the end of the note
whether the defendant who said she "wigged out" and was not conscious of her surroundings
while driving a car should be treated as having an sudden-onset illness or as having a mental de-
ficiency.
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in assessing the defendant's reasonableness has become outdated. In-
deed, the Restatement's statement of the rationales underlying the rule
seems quite startling.1 7 This provides an early lesson in arguing for
legal change: an advocate can either attempt to fit a fact pattern that
seemingly should be in one category into a more favorable category or
more broadly attack the system of categorization as irredeemably
flawed. 11
The civil rights perspective is also relevant in the area of negli-
gent entrustment. Courts must sometimes determine whether mer-
chants or others should be held liable for selling or providing products
to others who appear unable to use them safely." 9 Merchants who re-
alize or should realize a purchaser may be unable to safely operate a
product so as not to endanger others and sell the product nevertheless
should perhaps be liable for injuries resulting from the customer's
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b (1965). The rationales are listed
as follows:
1. The difficulty of drawing any satisfactory line between mental deficiency
and those variations of temperament, intellect, and emotional balance
which cannot, as a practical matter, be taken into account in imposing li-
ability for damage done.
2. The unsatisfactory character of the evidence of mental deficiency in many
cases, together with the ease with which it can be feigned, the difficulties
which the triers of fact must encounter in determining its existence, nature,
degree, and effect; and some fear of introducing into the law of torts the
confusion which has surrounded such a defense in the criminal law....
3. The feeling that if mental defectives are to live in the world they should
pay for the damage they do, and that it is better that their wealth, if any,
should be used to compensate innocent victims than that it should remain
in their hands.
4. The belief that their liability will mean that those who have charge of them
or their estates will be stimulated to look after them, keep them in order,
and see that they do not do harm.
Id. Note that when the rule was adopted, the mentally ill were put on public display. Donna M.
Orzell, Note, The Toleration of Unjustified Distinctions Between the Mentally and Physically Dis-
abled in Lewis v. Kmart Corp. Makes One Thing Clear: Not All Disabilities Were Created Equal,
45 VILL. L. REV. 517, 517 (2000) ("in medieval England, people would pay to see mentally dis-
abled individuals publicly displayed").
118. This is, of course, exactly what the California Supreme Court did in Rowland v. Chris-
tian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), one of the cases excerpted in the Sixth Edition. FRANKLIN &
RABIN, supra note 32, at 172.
119. The recent case of Hamilton v. Beretta, 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001), which is sure to
make it into torts casebooks in the near future, provides an example of a more sophisticated neg-
ligent entrustment case-a claim not against retailers who directly interact with the purchaser,
but against gun manufacturers for their marketing practices. The New York Court of Appeals
ultimately found no duty of care, noting that gun control is a broader societal issue. Id. ("[w]hile
common-law principles can supplement a manufacturer's statutory duties, we should be cau-
tious in imposing novel theories of tort liability while the difficult problem of illegal gun sales in
the United States remains the focus of a national policy debate").
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negligent use of the product. Indeed, this may be the rule for the per-
son who buys an article for a friend or relative when they should real-
ize that the recipient cannot operate the product without endangering
others.12 However, we may not want individual merchants to decide
which customer characteristics justify refusing to sell an automobile or
a firearm to a customer for safety reasons. We might instead prefer
that the government, rather than individual merchants, assess a per-
son's qualifications. If government officials are charged with making
such decisions, at least we can ensure that they make such decisions
openly and without private motives. Otherwise, the person with a his-
tory of epilepsy may not be able to obtain necessary goods and services
because of a merchants' concern about potential liability should their
epileptic customer suffer a seizure and harm someone else.'21
The casebook addresses more conventional civil rights issues in
the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it cov-
ers claims arising from the use of racial epithets.1" The authors de-
scribe in some detail statutes enacted to provide causes of action re-
garding racial and sexual harassment and the Supreme Court case law
interpreting those statutes. However, controversies surrounding accu-
sations of shoplifting present issues of some importance to African
Americans that the authors could discuss in more detail. At least,
shop owners' greater suspicions of African American shoppers is a
public issue in contemporary society.' 23 The authors essentially dis-
cuss the New York statutory law with regard to shoplifting to supple-
ment the students understanding of the tort of false imprisonment. 24
Indeed, I teach the intentional tort of false imprisonment using a hy-
pothetical involving shoplifting. In the hypothetical, a shop owner
threatens to summon the police to arrest a customer unless he remains
120. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 179-82 (citing Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103
(Vt. 1989)).
121. The major piece that has focused on this issue dealt with it from a very different per-
spective, the economic perspective, arguing the unfairness of imposing upon merchants the bur-
den of depriving potential customers of the ability to purchase items on the basis of amorphous,
hard to apply standards. Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction Tort:
Imposing Common Law Liability on Merchants for Sales and Leases to 'Defective' Customers, 1988
DUKE L.J. 755 (1988).
122. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 894-95.
123. Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell
in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 148-49 (1994).; see also James L. Fennessy, Com-
ment, New Jersey Law and Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patrons from Retail Stores
Based on the Mere Suspicion of Shoplifting, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 549, 549 n.157 (1999);
ABC News 20/20: Under Suspicion, Security Guards Unfairly Target Black Shoppers (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, June 8, 1998), available at 1998 WL 5433617.
124. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 886-88. They also occasionally touch on
gender issues. Id. at 53, 895-98 (reasonable woman standard).
[Vol. 25:1
The Wide World of Torts
in the store to defend himself against the shoplifting allegation. Stu-
dents may well voice sharply contrasting views on the reasonableness
of the customer's desire to leave the store and the reasonableness of
the storeowner's response. Their differing views may well reflect their
racial and socioeconomic background. The casebook could retain its
detailed discussion of New York law but also provide a broader de-
scription of the law of shoplifting that would expose students to the
major approaches that states take.
II. LEGAL DOCTRINE IN FRANKLIN AND RABIN'S CASEBOOK
Franklin and Rabin's coverage of several specific subject areas
warrant attention. I will examine their coverage of negligence causes
of action and focus on four particular areas: pure emotional harm;
medical malpractice; regulatory compliance; and proximate cause. I
will then discuss Franklin and Rabin's coverage of products liability,
intentional torts, defamation, and privacy.
A. Negligence
The changes in the authors' treatment of negligence causes of ac-
tion consists largely of replacing cases and updating notes. However,
the authors did significantly revise the sections on emotional harm,
medical malpractice, and wrongful birth/wrongful life. The authors
cover the standard areas, exploring the major issues regarding each of
the five elements of a negligence cause of action: duty, breach, actual
cause, proximate cause, and damages. They also discuss the standard
defenses: contributory negligence; explicit assumption of the risk; im-
plicit assumption of the risk; and now, federal preemption. The au-
thors devote the most attention to examining various aspects of the in-
quiry regarding the duty element of negligence causes of action.
The new edition does raise additional issues. The authors pro-
vide a case that reflects the modern trend toward one uniform stan-
dard of care. For instance, many courts have abandoned the doctrine
that held common carriers to the highest standard of care.'25 The au-
thors also broach the issue of child molestation, raising the issue in the
context of the duty of school districts to fully reveal information that
might indicate a former employee's tendency toward sexual molesta-
tion.'26 The authors also add a nice case to the section covering de-
fenses, addressing the issue of respective responsibility for a plaintiff
and medical personnel when plaintiffs who negligently injure them-
125. E.g., Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1998).
126. Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
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selves then become the victims of medical malpractice during the
course of treatment for their injuries.127 The case picks up some of the
issues that would otherwise be lost by the deletion of Falcon v. Memo-
rial Hospital.
128
The remainder of this section will focus on four aspects of the
negligence materials: medical malpractice; emotional harm; regulatory
compliance; and proximate cause.
1. Emotional Harm
The authors have made progress in the new edition toward orga-
nizing pure emotional harm materials in a very effective manner.
However, perhaps the authors should more clearly delineate three
relatively distinct categories of emotional harm cases. They seem to
have informally arrayed the cases into three categories already. The
first type of case involves emotional distress due to concern about
one's own physical safety; the second involves emotional distress at-
tributable to the prospect of harm to another person, such as a family
member. A third category involves cases where a plaintiff's emotional
distress does not stem from physical harm or realistic threat of physi-
cal harm to himself or others-the cases involving misdirected tele-
grams and mishandled human remains arguably fit into this cate-
gory.'29 A much clearer example of such a case, and one that
effectively makes the point that negligence can lead to emotional harm
in the absence of physical danger, is the law graduate who is negli-
127. Fritts v. McKinne, 934 P.2d 371 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
128. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 32, at 300 (citing Falcon v. Mem'l Hosp., 467
N.W.2d 25 (Mich. 1991)). In Falcon, the majority explained that the court needed to endorse a
loss of the chance of life theory because doctors would otherwise suffer no consequence for failing
to provide patients with the skill that they had contracted to provide. Under conventional tort
law, if a patient has a 10% chance of living and the doctor's negligence precipitates the patient's
death, the plaintiff can recover nothing. However, patients patronize doctors expecting them to
exercise their skills even when the chance of survival are slim. Fritts v. McKinne, 934 P.2d 371
(Okla. Civ. App. 1996), picks up this contract based argument in a different situation, where
plaintiff needs medical treatment because of his own negligent act. Though comparative negli-
gence almost always applies in torts, here it does not because the doctor agreed to provide com-
petent treatment and also has a professional obligation to do so regardless of the manner in which
plaintiff was injured. See generally Cowen v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a
wrongful death claim for negligence in providing psychiatric care to a suicidal patient not barred
by contributory negligence even though plaintiff committed suicide).
129. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987), is a case
that represents the third category. Plaintiff (to whom a severed arm was delivered in the days
following his father's death) did in a sense have a concern about the physical integrity of his fa-
ther's remains, but this is far different from the standard concern in second category cases about
the prospect of injury or death to a living person.
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gently informed that she has failed the bar exam when in fact she has
not.130
The authors excerpt a case in which parents sue for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress because a hospital failed to take proper
precautions to prevent the kidnapping of newborns. The case, Johnson
v. Jamaica Hospital,'13 illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing emo-
tional distress over physical danger to others and emotional distress
essentially unrelated to concerns about physical safety. In Johnson, the
plaintiff argued that hospitals have a judicially-enforceable duty to
safeguard children in order to protect their parents from emotional
distress. The majority, which finds that the hospital had no such le-
gally-enforceable duty, treats the case as one involving fear of physical
harm to a relative. Their resolution of the case is unappealing be-
cause, at base, the case involves much more: interference with the rela-
tionship between parent and child. Interference with the bonding of
parents and newborns causes parents an emotional harm independent
of either physical injury or the prospect of physical injury to their
child. Even if the parent were convinced that the kidnapper would
provide fabulous care and ensure the child's safety, the parents would
nevertheless suffer grave harm.'32 Johnson segues very nicely into the
wrongful birth and wrongful life cases.133
The emotional harm section of the sixth edition began with a fear
of AIDS case: K.A.C. v. Benson.' Given the dramatic and socially
relevant nature of fear of AIDS cases, one might find surprising
Franklin and Rabin's decision in the seventh edition to banish the fear
130. A professor might initiate an interesting discussion by asking students to consider the
potential tort liability for emotional trauma based on allegations that companies paid to clean up
crime scenes negligently performed the task. This little-known, but apparently rather sizable,
industry is discussed in Francis X. Clines, The Corpse is Gone: Enter Quietly the Cleaners, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1999, at A14. This might be a situation in which courts are particularly likely
to impose liability, given the high probability that negligently failing to clean away evidence of
death might cause emotional trauma. An alternative approach would be to expand the "mishan-
dling of corpse" exception.
131. 467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984). An interesting recent case that distinguishes Johnson v.
Jamaica Hospital is Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
132. I embellish the hypothetical a bit in class by asking the class to assume that a cleric, at
the request of the kidnapper, calls the baby's parents to assure them that the baby is with a lov-
ing couple who are financially better off and that there is no prospect of physical harm to the
child. We would obviously say that the parents have still suffered harm even if the cleric con-
vinced them of their child's well-being.
133. In their latest edition, the authors have moved the wrongful birth and wrongful life
section and updated it. They now use only one principal case in the section, but that case does
set forth the conflicting policies that influence the courts in this area. The new material, how-
ever, provides a fuller discussion of relevant state statutes and identifies a new type of cause of
action, wrongful prolongation of life. A wrongful prolongation of life claim arises when medical
personnel negligently resuscitate a patient who does not wish to be revived.
134. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
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of AIDS caselaw to a note. Perhaps, however, they have made a wise
choice.'35 Fear of AIDS cases possess a unique attribute that makes
conventional judicial paradigms for emotional distress cases difficult
to apply. Conventional emotional distress doctrine assumes that
physical trauma is the source of potential injury; thus the closer the
defendant's action comes to creating such trauma, the more reasonable
it is to award liability for the victim's concern about the potential
physical injury, which through good fortune he escaped. Thus, tort
doctrine can base liability on questions of the degree of physical prox-
imity between a plaintiff and some negligently created danger, which
is closely related to the prospect that the victim will suffer some sort of
physical trauma. The zone of danger test and the impact test turn al-
135. The fear of AIDS cases clearly provide another opportunity to talk about the civil
rights implications of tort law. In particular, the question of whether courts give relief based on
plaintiffs actual fear or on a reasonable level of fear has implications for the status of those af-
flicted with HIV. Awarding damages for wildly disproportionate fears that result from misin-
formation about the realistic risks of transmission will both encourage such misinformation and
result in people unduly avoiding relationships with HIV positive individuals--even in ways that
pose no risk of HIV transmission. See Williamson v. Waldman 696 A.2d 14, 21-22 (1997) ("[a]
reasonableness standard that requires only common knowledge about AIDS, however, does not
address adequately concerns about the prevalence of misinformation and ignorance, and thus
serves indirectly to encourage hysteria as well as prejudice and discrimination").
This highlights a more general point that arises on rare occasion in tort doctrine: the question
of whether damages awards should be considered purely descriptive or should be viewed as in-
cluding some normative component. Individuals may actually suffer certain damages, but only
because of some undesirable aspect of society. Thus, a white person may suffer real harm to
reputation by being identified as African American, and in many states, up until the 1960s, indi-
viduals could recover damages on such a claim. However, as a normative matter, allowing causes
of action because a white person is identified as African American serves to reinforce a racial
caste system (particularly because an African American was unlikely to be able to recover for
being falsely identified as white). Should damages be denied on such claims because awarding
damages in such circumstances is normatively unappealing, or should damages be awarded be-
cause they reflect actual injury to an individual who is entitled to value the esteem in which he is
held by racists? See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of
Community, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1996). A similar analysis can be offered with regard to the use
of race based, life expectancy tables to determine a plaintiffs life expectancy for purposes of cal-
culating damages. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73
(1994); see also Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justifi-
cation Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23 n.70 (1999).
Cases raising the question of the normative/descriptive nature of damages must be distin-
guished from actual cause cases in which we look at what the reasonable person would have done
if he had received warning rather than what the actual plaintiff would have done. In such actual
cause cases, we need to answer the counterfactual question of what would the plaintiff have done
if he had been informed of a safety risk. However, we are concerned about the quality of the
most direct evidence, the testimony of the plaintiff himself. In particular, we wish to avoid rely-
ing on a very interested witness to accurately recount his own state of mind. This problem arises
in the informed consent and warning defect cases and get just about the coverage they warrant.
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 129 n.9 (medical malpractice), 586-87 n.2 (defects in
product warnings and instructions).
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most exclusively on the degree of physical proximity, and even the
relative bystander test seems to require physical proximity as a pre-
requisite. In fear of AIDS cases, however, conventional physical
trauma has little relationship to the degree of danger. Mere physical
proximity, or even actual physical contact, cannot be considered suffi-
cient to provide a cause of action because few recognized means of
transmitting the HIV virus exist even between those who have come
into physical contact with one another. Thus, the decisions in fear of
AIDS cases often have a curious quality. The Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision in Benson, that a patient given a gynecological exam
by HIV infected doctor could not prove she was in the "zone of dan-
ger" seems a misapplication of the zone of danger test. Indeed, the
plaintiff should not even have needed to rely on the zone of danger test
because the physician's act of touching her would surely satisfy the
impact rule if the case were analyzed conventionally. Thus, a fear of
AIDS case does not provide an effective introduction to the emotional
harm materials.136 Falzone v. Busch,'37 a much more straightforward
emotional distress case involving fear of traumatic injury, namely fear
of being struck by a car, provides a much more effective starting point.
The authors nevertheless expose the students to issues very much like
those posed by the fear of AIDS cases in the new case they have
added: Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley.-3
2. Medical Malpractice
Over the years and various editions, Franklin and Rabin have
given medical malpractice rather cursory treatment, 139 but the atten-
tion they accorded the subject seems to be growing over time. The
materials have been updated for the seventh edition, but nevertheless
136. However, interesting comparisons can be drawn between the New Jersey approach to
such cases, as set forth in Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997), and the Minnesota
Supreme Court's approach set forth in K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 32, at 226-30.
137. 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 261-65.
138. 521 U.S. 424 (1997), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 270-75. Metro-North
was brought under the Federal Employee Labor Act (FELA). An earlier FELA case that pro-
vides a wonderful overview and discussion of the alternative approaches to emotional harm cases
and the rationales for those varying approaches is Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S.
532 (1994), a case which, in past years, I have provided to my students in excerpted form.
139. For example while Franklin and Rabin devote a mere 17 pages in their sixth edition to
medical malpractice, another leading casebook, DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORT
AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INJURY (3d ed. 1997), devotes forty-eight pages to medical malpractice. Id. at 333-81. Granted,
some noted torts casebooks do not treat medical malpractice as a unified topic at all. See, e.g.,
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 89; JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS (5th
ed. 1999),
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require further revision. The authors appear to barely mention one of
the dominant forces in the field of medicine: the health maintenance
organization ("HMO"). The rise of the HMOs over the past decade
requires the attention of torts casebook writers for two reasons. 4 '
First, the ascendancy of HMOs provides a reason to question
whether the traditional professional standard that applies to doctors
should remain unchanged. The most persuasive justification for the
professional standard, which in effect lets the medical profession con-
clusively set the standard of care, is cogently presented in a little-
known Arizona Supreme Court case, Rossell v. Volkswagen.' In par-
ticular, professionals are expected to consider foremost their clients'
interests rather than their own economic interests. 42 As the Rossell
court explained: "Special groups will be allowed to create their own
standards of reasonably prudent conduct only when the nature of the
group and its special relationship with its clients assure society that
those standards will be set with primary regard to the protection of the
public rather than to such considerations as increased profitability." '
The development of HMOs puts into doubt the presumed congruence
of the physician's and the patient's interests. HMOs were established
precisely to reintroduce cost constraints on physicians. 44 Such cost
constraints were absent under fee-paid insurance plans because those
receiving services, and thus deciding whether to approve a doctor's of-
fer of those services, paid a fraction of those services' marginal cost.
With the ascendancy of HMOs, the assumption that the professional
standard primarily reflects patients' interests may no longer be true.'45
140. Peter K. Kilborn, Workers Getting Greater Freedom in Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1997, at Al (in 1988, 71% of employees were insured under fee for service plans; by
1997, only 18% of employees were covered by fee-for-service plans).
141. 709 P.2d 517 (Ariz. 1985). In Rossell, defendant car manufacturer argued that the
professional standard of care applies to automakers, so that automakers would set safety stan-
dards for cars.
142. Id. at 522-23. This basic argument could also be presented on the basis of excerpted
articles. E.g., Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J.
528, 536-37 (1976). An excerpted version of Pearson's article appears in a torts anthology pub-
lished by Anderson Publishing Company. JULIE A. DAVIES ET AL., A TORTS ANTHOLOGY
129-39 (2d ed. 1999). Other rationales for the professional standard of care have been advanced,
but none are particularly persuasive.
143. Rossell, 709 P.2d at 523.
144. See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET. AL., HEALTH LAW § 7-6, §7-12, at 414-16 (2d ed.
2000); see also June M. Sullivan, Overcoming the ERISA Barrier to Recovery Against HMOs: Cur-
rent Trends and Legislation, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245, 248-51 (2001).
145. Another contemporary setting in which the lack of congruence of physician and pa-
tient interests raises questions is the pre-employment physical (or any physical required by
someone other than the patient) that reveals a serious medical condition. The question confront-
ing courts is whether the physician has a legally enforceable duty to advise the individual of a
serious medical condition discovered during the examination. Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433
(N.J. 2001) (finding such a duty).
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Thus, perhaps courts should reconsider application of the professional
standard to the practice of medicine.'46
Second, because the question of ability to sue HMOs for cover-
age decisions is such a major contemporary issue,' a torts book can-
not ignore it. Indeed, this might be another area in which having stu-
dents work with a statute might prove a useful pedagogical tool,
148
particularly given that the subject should surely strike students as
topical. The rise of HMOs also raises questions of federal law and
federal preemption of state common law tort actions and judicial doc-
trines.'49 In any event, lawyers may increasingly need to know about
HMO's amenability to suit.
146. E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: Restructuring the Legal Standard
of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1997). Indeed, there have been a few efforts to directly change
medical standards by statutes. The most popular have been efforts to limit the restriction that
HMOs have placed on the length of hospital stays associated with childbirth. A number of
states, including New Jersey and New York, have prohibited HMOs from requiring hospitals to
discharge patients in less than forty-eight hours after childbirth. See Beth Mandel Rosenthal,
Note, Drive-Through Deliveries, and the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 753, 754 n.8, 759-62 (1997). A federal statute prohibiting this practice took ef-
fect on January 1, 1998. 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1998).
147. Tiffany T. Theodos, Patients' Bill of Rights: Women's Rights Under Managed Care and
ERISA Preemption, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 89-91 (2000); Peggy L. Noble, Comment, The
Mismanagement of Managed Care Legislation: A Comparison Between the Democratic-proposed Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 and the Republican-proposed Patient Protection Act of 1998, 28
CAP. U. L. REV. 685, 685-86 (2000); Alison Mitchell & Robert Pear, Senate Considers Patients'
Rights in Test With Bush, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2001, at Al.
148. A state statute authorizing suits against HMOs like the statute enacted in the state of
Texas, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001), could pro-
vide such a pedagogical tool.
149. Franklin and Rabin cover federal preemption elsewhere. In the sixth edition, they
covered the subject in the context of products liability, an area in which the issue frequently
arises and in which several United States Supreme Court cases have concentrated. E.g., Buck-
man Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280 (1995); Cippalone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The discussion there also
dovetails nicely with institutional competence issues between jury versus regulatory agency
evaluation of product design and federal as opposed to state regulation of product safety.
FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 580-81; see also FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 32, at
514. In the new edition, the authors have moved the discussion of preemption to their general
chapter on defenses for negligence causes of action, as federal preemption comes up in interesting
contexts other than products liability litigation (as the authors briefly note). See English v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); see also FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 497 (citing Pegram
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (ERISA preemption of HMO liability)). Recently, for exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed preemption issues with regard to the adequacy of warn-
ings at railroad grade crossings. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); see also
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). I assigned an excerpted version of the
case to discuss both preemption issues and the significance of regulatory compliance. The case is
too complicated for students, especially for that early stage in the course (but perhaps a different
judgment is appropriate if torts is not being taught during the first semester of the first year of
law school).
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In addition, introducing medical malpractice requires considera-
tion of the respective liabilities of hospitals and attending physicians
for patient injuries that occur during hospital care. Questions of re-
spondeat superior and the status of medical personnel as either ser-
vants or independent contractors have some importance, and students
should be introduced to such issues.' The authors attempt to raise
these issues in a case they place in the new vicarious liability section
added to chapter one: Baptist Memorial Hospital System v. Sampson.'
The case may ultimately prove too complex for that preliminary stage
of the course and, in any event, does not provide a general discussion
of respondeat superior issues in the hospital setting. Baptist Memorial
Hospital seems to turn on the issue of apparent authority. The law re-
garding the level of actual control that transforms an independent con-
tractor into a servant presents a sufficiently difficult challenge without
introducing the issue of apparent authority. 2 Perhaps, the authors
could more effectively discuss respondeat superior in the medical con-
text in the notes following Ybarra v. Spangard.'3
Given the role of agencies in deciding whether statutes or regulations preempt state common
law or state statute, the executive order on federalism that provides directive to agencies in mak-
ing such determinations should also be cited. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 4, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255
(Aug. 4, 1999).
150. A good summary is provided in FURROW ET. AL., supra note 144, at § 7.1. Indeed,
when discussing alternatives to the torts system, the authors properly note and briefly describe
some of the work of Paul Weiler regarding enterprise liability and hospitals having procedures to
reduce the number of mistakes. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 854-56 (discussing PAUL
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)). Weiler argues that medical errors can
be reduced more dramatically by focusing on designing procedures to reduce the likelihood that
physicians and other medical personnel will err, rather than by concentrating on sanctioning
physicians when they err.
151. 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998).
152. Indeed, apparent authority seems grounded more in a quasi-contractual claim of justi-
fiable reliance upon the implicit representation evidenced by defendant's conduct rather than tort
theory of a duty to exercise due care with regard to patient's safety or a theory of risk-spreading
and internalization of costs.
153. The authors have markedly improved the informed consent materials. Matties v. Ma-
tromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999), raises an important issue that challenges the traditional
judicial approach to the question of informed consent. In particular, courts view invasive proce-
dures as triggering informed consent requirements, but other non-surgical medical responses,
including doing nothing, have not traditionally been subjected to informed consent require-
ments. Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest,
95 YALE L.J. 219, 229 (1985) ("ultimately, physical contact is too literal a demarcation for what
is a much broader, non-tangible interest in patient choice").
The casebook canvasses other more traditional informed consent situations and mentions a
couple of statutes on the subject. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 126-29. The casebook
also mentions the special causation questions presented by informed consent cases. Informed
consent cases force courts to decide whether a patient would have undergone the operation even
if fully informed, yet there is little reliable information with which to answer such a speculative
question. Id. at 129 (Note 9). This special causation issue has lost emphasis because it is no
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3. Regulatory Compliance
Franklin and Rabin discuss the relevance of statutory require-
ments to the breach of duty inquiry. However, they focus almost ex-
clusively on the significance of deviation from statutory requirements,
giving little attention to the significance of statutory compliance."5 4
The authors' choice is hardly surprising given the greater significance
courts accord to statutory violations. Courts have traditionally con-
sidered violation of statutory requirements as presumptive negligence,
but compliance with statutory commands raises no presumption that
an actor satisfied his duty of care. Several scholars have suggested
that, at least in some circumstances, such a presumption that the actor
has exercised due care should arise. Such a "regulatory compliance
defense" has increasingly become the subject of debate-a debate in
which casebook co-author Robert Rabin himself has participated."' 5
Not only is the debate significant in itself, but also it may help schol-
ars and students gain a deeper understanding of our approach to de-
termining the standard of care in general. Our asymmetrical treat-
ment of statutory violation and statutory compliance clearly suggests
some skepticism about the government setting optimal safety stan-
dards; we appear confident that the government will not set them too
high, but fear that it will set them too low. An exploration of these
apparently contradictory judgments might illustrate the considerations
underlying courts' assessments of the respective significance of judicial
expertise, jury intuition, industry custom, professional norms, and
statutory/regulatory standards to the breach of duty inquiry.
4. Proximate Cause
The authors have organized the material on proximate cause
quite effectively, but they could make one improvement. They should
begin the exploration of proximate cause with the "unexpected man-
longer discussed in a principal case (as it was in the sixth edition, see FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra
note 32, at 108-11).
154. The discussion in the seventh edition, while longer than that in the sixth edition, is
insufficient to properly cover the subject. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 76, 83-85.
155. E.g., Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2000); Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance
and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461 (1997); Theresa
Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between
the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Com-
pliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of
Symmetry in Products Liaiblity, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Com-
pliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000);
AM. LAW INST., 2 REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 83-110 (1991).
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ner" case presented by the authors, McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appli-
ances,15 6 and then proceed through the rest of the chapter in order.
Otherwise, McLaughlin interrupts the natural progression from the
concept of the egg-shell plaintiff'57 to In re Polemis5 8 to Wagon
Mound.'59 Ironically, the pedagogically sound progression in the book
differs from the ultimate order of analysis I suggest to students.
I suggest that students first determine whether the plaintiff is
foreseeable. If the plaintiff is not foreseeable, proximate cause does
not exist. If the plaintiff is foreseeable the student must determine
whether the harm is sufficiently direct despite either the unexpected
extent of the plaintiffs injury or the unexpected manner of injury.
Ordinarily, if the harm is sufficiently direct, there is proximate cause;
if not, proximate cause does not exist. Finally, if the extent of the
plaintiffs injury was unexpected, the student must determine whether
the plaintiffs injury is of a different type than that which could have
been expected. For instance, a defendant's negligence might have put
a plaintiffs property interests at risk, but unexpectedly caused the
plaintiff bodily harm. In such cases, if the type of harm a plaintiff suf-
fered is unforeseeable, proximate cause is absent. 6° Each of the first
three basic situations referred to above has a corollary: for unexpected
plaintiff cases, it is the special rule covering voluntary rescuers; 6' for
unexpected extent of harm cases, it is the secondary harm doctrine;'62
and for unexpected manner cases it is the rule governing situations in
which third party misconduct intervenes to cause the injury.
163
156. 181 N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1962).
157. The authors have replaced Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970),
with Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994).
158. 3 K.B. 560 (A.C. 1921), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 404-05.
159. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 405-09 (citing Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd., [1961] App. Cas. 338 (P.C. 1961) (appeal taken from
N.S.W.)).
160. In effect, there are two approaches to determining proximate cause-the foreseeability
test and the direct harm test-and one or the other applies in each of the four basic proximate
cause contexts. The foreseeability approach applies in cases involving harms to unexpected
plaintiffs and to cases involving unexpected types of harm. The direct harm test applies in cases
where only the manner or extent of harm is unexpected.
161. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). Though a voluntary rescuer may
not have foreseeably been endangered by defendant's conduct, he nevertheless qualifies as a fore-
seeable plaintiff if injured in the course of rescuing someone endangered by defendants conduct
because defendants should foresee that those who are safe may endanger themselves by attempt-
ing to rescue others. In other words, to use the celebrated phrase coined by Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, "danger invites rescue." Id. at 437.
162. The secondary harm doctrine provides that an actor who negligently injures another is
also liable for any additional injuries suffered during the course of the victim's medical treat-
ment. See supra note 39, and accompanying text.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 442, 449 (1965).
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B. Products Liability
The materials on products liability provide a survey of the area
but lack the extraordinary depth of the negligence materials. The au-
thors cover the major topics, namely the tripartite categorization of
product defects into manufacturing defects, design defects, and warn-
ing defects, 164 the state-of-the art defense, the irreducibly unsafe prod-
uct, the product/service distinction, the significance of consumer mis-
behavior, and the confluence of strict liability and contract. 16  The
authors spend much of the chapter focusing on the defect inquiry.
They raise the issue of whether strict products liability really differs
from negligence liability when the alleged defect is in the design of the
product or the warnings accompanying it.
The authors have begun to incorporate the recently adopted Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. They now quote por-
tions of the Restatement (Third) and also change some of the terminol-
ogy to reflect that used in the new Restatement. For example, they
change "unavoidably unsafe" to "irreducibly dangerous" and give a
name to the concept of "reasonable alternative designs," which they
had discussed in previous editions. As suggested earlier, however, the
major noteworthy change in the products liability material is the new
section on workplace injuries.
1. Workplace Injuries
Workplace injuries pose a problem for products liability. First,
in the industrial setting, product purchasers and product users often
have quite divergent interests. Management officials deciding to pur-
chase industrial machinery will probably not use the machinery they
purchase. Supervisors demanding higher productivity even at the cost
of bypassing a product's safety features will not likely become victims
of the modified machine. In addition, because of workers' compensa-
tion, employers do not even bear the full cost of using dangerously de-
signed or modified equipment because they bear only a modest por-
164. The authors have added a principal case, Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245
(N.J. 1999), that addresses the frequently important issue of pharmaceutical company liability
for direct-to-consumer advertising in light of the traditional learned intermediary rule that al-
lowed pharmaceutical companies to merely communicate warnings to physicians who prescribed
the pharmaceuticals.
165. The authors abandoned any substantial discussion of warranty as a basis for claims for
recovery on injuries resulting from defective products when they jettisoned Hauter v. Zogarts,
534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975) (cited in MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 586-93 (5th ed. 1992)), as a principal case in the sixth
edition.
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tion of the loss their workers suffer.'66 Moreover, product sellers and
employers have incongruent liabilities for workers' injuries. Unlike
employers, whose liability to their employees is limited under workers'
compensation, product sellers remain fully liable in tort. Product sell-
ers thus bear full liability for the injuries that workers suffer as a result
of an employers' decisions to use dangerous machinery or defeat the
equipment's safety features.'67 The incongruity in product seller and
employer liability can be resolved in one of two ways. The employers'
workers compensation protections can be maintained, by prohibiting
the product seller from bringing a third party claim against the em-
ployer. In that case, the product seller cannot claim recompense from
the employer for damages it must pay to the injured worker even
though the injury may largely result from the employer's unreasonable
decisions to expose its workers to excessive danger. Alternatively,
product sellers can be allowed to seek contribution or indemnification
from an injured worker's employer. Such a rule defeats the employer's
protection under workers' compensation because the employer suffers
liability by means of the "back door", that is, by way of the worker's
suit against the manufacturer, who then impleads the worker's em-
ployer. 6 '
In presenting this area of the law, the authors have gathered con-
cepts scattered in various parts in previous editions. The authors have
brought together in the new section discussion of product seller liabil-
ity for injuries suffered from the operation of machines that were al-
tered post-sale, the "bulk supplier" exception to the duty to warn
product users, and the various approaches to manufacturers' third
party claims against employers. The two principal cases featured in
the section address product alteration in the workplace. One of the
cases, Jones v. Ryobi, Ltd. 169 remains from the sixth edition. The sec-
ond, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,7' the latest in a series of New York cases
dealing with post-sale alterations, discusses whether manufacturers
166. Judicial awards in torts cases theoretically impose the full cost of negligence or product
defects upon the tortfeasor. However, given the delay that pursuing judicial remedies entails and
the frequency with which such cases settle, the system of judicial awards may come no closer to
fully imposing costs of injuries upon actors than does the workers compensation system.
167. Of course, the product seller may sometimes be able to raise a contributory negligence
defense or may successfully argue that they are completely immune from liability because of
product alteration.
168. Interestingly, the contrasting approaches to this question taken by New York and
New Jersey required the Second Circuit to determine whether New York or New Jersey had ju-
risdiction over Ellis Island. Collins v. Promark Prods., Inc., 956 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1992). The
Supreme Court ultimately resolved the boundary dispute in an original jurisdiction case brought
by New Jersey against New York. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998).
169. 37 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1994).
170. 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998).
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have a duty to warn the product purchasers' employees who will actu-
ally use the machine of the dangers posed by product modifications.
The court concluded that even when a worker cannot sue the manu-
facturer because his employer has altered the product by removing a
safety device, the seller may nevertheless be liable for failing to warn
the employee of the dangers attendant in operating the device without
the proper safety attachments.
In addition to the issues broached in the sixth edition, the au-
thors use the notes after Jones and Liriano to raise three new issues.
First, the authors summarize a case about attributing to employees
their employers' decisions to purchase cheaper but more dangerous
versions of products. In other words, should a product seller be per-
mitted to defend against a worker's strict products liability suit by ar-
guing that the employer deliberately decided to purchase a device that
had fewer safety features? Second, the authors raise the question of
whether an employer's explicit assumption of risk by signing an
agreement absolving a product seller of liability for product defects
can bind the employer's workers. That is, can such an agreement pre-
clude injured employees from bringing a cause of action against the
manufacturer? Third, the authors raise the question of employer coer-
cion of employees.
In most cases presented in the casebook, plaintiffs make the deci-
sion to confront risk. If they decide not to confront the risk, they will
suffer few adverse consequences. In the employment situation, how-
ever, refusal to confront a risk because it appears unreasonably dan-
gerous may come at a severe price-loss of one's employment-
particularly when the employee is explicitly directed to use equipment
that lacks the proper safety devices. In such circumstances, the em-
ployer, rather than the employee, has decided that the employee will
confront a significant risk. The employer should be precluded from
interposing a contributory negligence defense based on the worker's
unreasonableness in confronting the risk when defending against li-
ability. This, of course, is generally an academic question because
traditional tort claims against employers are barred by workers' com-
pensation laws"' Perhaps, the manufacturer could raise a contribu-
tory negligence defense against the injured worker who felt compelled
171. However, the issue may come up when teachers instruct students to confront certain
risks or when high school coaches instruct their players to take certain risks. Verduce v. Bd. of
Higher Educ., 192 N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959), rev'd, 168 N.E.2d 838 (N.Y. 1960)
(college drama students threatened with loss of role and resulting disqualification from a drama
workshop if she refused to descend steps without looking down); Rutter v. N.E. Beaver County
Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981) (high school student injured when his coach required him
to participate in "jungle football" in order to make the team).
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to comply with his employer's orders because the manufacturer of the
product played no role in the coercion. On the other hand, the fact
that the product seller did not coerce the employee does not make the
employee any less worthy of recovery for his or her injury.
2. Service/Product Distinction
Franklin and Rabin have also greatly improved the products li-
ability discussion of strict liability for service providers by jettisoning
Hoven v. Koble, the mainstay of that section in previous editions. Ho-
yen provided an example of the paradigmatic type of case in which
strict liability is inappropriate: where strict liability would result in
imposing liability on professionals engaging in an inexact science
whenever their efforts produced adverse results. The authors have re-
placed Hoven with Royer v. Catholic Medical Center, a New Hamp-
shire case that raises the more nuanced and difficult issues presented
by hybrid cases in which the defendant simultaneously provides a
product and a service.'72 In Royer, doctors performed a knee replace-
ment operation during which they implanted a defective artificial
knee. The court held that the hospital (and more generally providers
of medical care) could not be sued under a strict liability theory for the
defective prosthesis. This result does appear to contrast with the
likely result in a case in which an injured car owner seeks to sue a me-
chanic for installing brakes that ultimately proved defective. Trying
to distinguish the auto mechanic that provides defective brakes from
the doctor that provides a defective prosthesis is difficult 173 except,
that is, on the basis of a policy judgment that the practice of medicine
merits heightened protection.
174
172. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 632-35 (citing Royer v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 741
A.2d 74 (N.H. 1999)).
173. I have excerpted William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Products and Services in Strict
Liability, 62 N.C. L. REv. 415 (1984), which discusses the issue from the perspective of law and
economics policies that appear throughout the casebook's treatment of strict and absolute liabil-
ity. The author essentially asks whether the policies underlying strict products liability in tort
suggest that provision of services should also be subject to strict liability.
174. Royer, 741 A.2d at 78. One could advance a law and economics argument for greater
reticence in applying strict liability in the medical setting. Traditionally, the market for medical
services did not operate like many other markets, as noted above. See notes 142-45 supra and
accompanying text. Patients and doctors who traditionally have made the decisions about utiliz-
ing certain medical services do not pay the marginal cost of those services. As a result, if inter-
nalization of the cost is intended to allow the market to translate consumers' desires into the op-
timal amount of consumption through the operation of the pricing mechanism, the traditional
medical market will frustrate that goal. Imposing strict liability will raise the cost of medical de-
vices and medical procedures without reducing their cost. Thus, one could have argued that
strict liability was inappropriate in the medical setting, at least before the rise of health mainte-
nance organizations, managed care, and cost control/utilization review.
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C. Intentional Torts
The intentional harm material provides the fundamentals of the
law relating to intentional tort and discusses some contemporary is-
sues. The authors provide principal cases setting forth the elements of
a prima facie case for four basic intentional torts: battery, assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Most
of the principal cases have been carried over from the prior edition.
Garratt v. Dailey.7 provides a good vehicle for exploring the difference
in the mental states needed for intentional and unintentional torts.
Some intriguing questions may arise at the boundary between inten-
tional and unintentional torts, as the authors briefly suggest in a note
following Garratt.'76 For example, why is a company that produces a
line of products it knows will cause injuries to some consumers poten-
tially liable for an unintentional tort on the basis of negligence or strict
products liability rather than for the intentional tort of battery?'77 I
often explore that interesting question with my students.
A new case in the section, Wishnatsky v. Huey, 7 ' explores the
scope of the "offensive touching" element of battery in today's
crowded world. The defendant and the plaintiffs supervisor were
meeting privately in the supervisor's office when the plaintiff opened
the office door without knocking and began to enter. Defendant forci-
bly closed the door, pushing the plaintiff out of the door jamb. The
North Dakota Court of Appeals, after canvassing two perspectives re-
garding such incidental contact, concluded that the contact was not of-
fensive and thus no cause of action for battery lay.
The authors introduce students to a burgeoning field of tort law:
claims filed in Unites States courts under the Alien Tort Claim Act
179
for torture and other human rights abuses perpetrated by foreign offi-
cials in foreign countries. 8 They do not, however, note a less marked
legal development: suits against government officials in the United
States brought by aliens for human rights abuses within the United
States. 8 ' Such suits will quite possibly have significant implication for
the administration of the immigration laws of this country. Many
175. 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
176. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 868 (Note 3).
177. The difference is important because a defendant is liable for an unintentional tort only
if the cost of his conduct exceeds its benefits, whereas there is no such requirement with respect
to intentional torts. Of course, some of the defenses to intentional torts (like those of self-defense
and defense of others) do protect defendants when the benefits of their actions exceed the costs.
178. 584 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998) (p. 877).
179. Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
180. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 879-82.
181. Jama v. United States I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998).
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such abuses occur in facilities detaining aliens who have entered or
remained in the country without proper documentation and seek ei-
ther political asylum or some other discretionary adjustment of their
immigration status.
The defenses to intentional tort actions are explored by cases
rather than, as in prior editions, excerpts from Morris on Torts.
1 12
The authors use principal cases to highlight the defenses of consent,
self-defense, defense of property, and private necessity. The authors
present a case arising out of an illegal prize fight, Hart v. Geysel, 83 to
explore issues of consent. They use an 1896 Colorado Supreme Court
case, Courvoisier v. Raymond, 84 to illustrate that self-defense claims
turn on a reasonable perception of danger, not actual danger. In the
case, defendant shot a law enforcement officer when the officer
stepped from an unruly, threatening crowd toward the defendant. De-
fendant claimed that under the circumstances he thought the plaintiff
officer would attack him. The court held that the trial court should
have instructed the jury to consider defendant's assertion even though,
as it turned out, the officer had stepped forward to investigate the in-
cident. The authors use the classic Katko v. Briney185 to explore prop-
erty owners' privilege to use force in defending their property. In
Katko, a burglar sues a homeowner for the injuries received when he
tripped the homeowners' spring gun. The authors retain the truly
classic Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,186 from earlier editions,
to introduce the defense of private necessity.
1 87
The authors then provide a substantial examination of constitu-
tional tort causes of action-both actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against state officials acting under color of state law and implied rights
of action under the United States Constitution against federal offi-
cials. 8
The authors do miss an opportunity to revisit respondeat supe-
rior liability in the context of intentional torts. Professors could use
182. CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS (2d ed. 1980).
183. 159 Wash. 632, 294 P. 570 (1930).
184. 47 P. 284 (Colo. 1896).
185. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
186. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
187. The defense of private necessity differs from the other defenses because the actor must
nevertheless compensate the property owner for his intrusion. However, the defense enables the
actor who invades another's interests to sue for damages if the person upon whose interests he
intrudes engages in self-help to vindicate those interests. See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt.
1908) (dock owner who cut loose plaintiff's ship, which had without permission tied up to the
dock to avoid hazards of a storm, liable for damage the ship sustained in the storm thereafter).
188. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 928-47. Damages actions against federal offi-
cials for constitutional violations are know as Bivens actions.
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any of a number of cases to explore such issues. However, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in John R. v. Oakland Unified School
District'89 not only addresses such issues, but it does so in a contempo-
rary, highly charged context that should stir student interest. In John
R., the court had to decide whether to hold a school district vicariously
liable for a teacher's molestation of a student. The teacher molested
the student while the two worked together at the teacher's home under
a program authorized by the school. One strength of the case for a
torts class is that the justices debate the application of principles used
throughout the course-internalization of cost, risk-spreading, and ac-
cident prevention-to the issue presented by the case. Ultimately, the
majority, over a strident dissent, refused to impose respondeat supe-
rior liability on the school district.
D. Defamation and Privacy
Given Marc Franklin's expertise in mass media law and his co-
authorship of a separate casebook in that subject, Mass Media Law, 9'
now in its sixth edition, it should come as no surprise that the Franklin
and Rabin's torts casebook continues to devote much more space to
defamation and privacy causes of action than many other torts case-
books of comparable length. 9' While these causes of action are often
associated with cases involving media defendants, such claims are of-
ten brought in non-media cases as well.'92
Franklin and Rabin's organization of the defamation materials
differs from the organization Franklin and his co-authors adopt for
those materials in Mass Media Law. Franklin and Rabin first present
189. 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989). The authors have now added Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Uni-
fied School District, 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997), another California case involving a teacher's sexual
relationship with a student, though not to illustrate vicarious liability.
190. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed.
2000). He is a co-author of other media law casebooks as well. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL.,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA (4th ed. 1996); T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA (8th ed. 2001).
191. Franklin and Rabin devote 267 pages to the subject. Dobbs and Hayden devote
thirty-two pages; Henderson, Pearson, and Siliciano devote 101 pages, and the current edition of
Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz devotes 136 pages to the subject.
192. Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 464-66, 480-81 (from 1976 through June of 1979 only 31% of
reported defamation cases involved media defendants). Indeed, the authors use decisions resolv-
ing two such lawsuits as principal cases. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 978-80 (excerpt-
ing Liberman v. Gelstein, 605 N.E.2d 344 (N.Y. 1992) (defamation arising out of a landlord-
tenant dispute)); FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 1067-74 (excerpting Flamm v. Am.
Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144 (2d. Cir. 2000) (involving allegedly defamatory entry in a
directory of lawyers published by American Association of University Women for use by the
association's membership)).
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the common law regarding defamation, outlining the common law
elements of such actions and the common law defenses to such ac-
tions. They then present the constitutional constraints arising out of
the seminal New York Times v. Sullivan,'93 which limit the common
law doctrines. This organization remains workable because so much
of the constitutional doctrine relates to the fault requirement and em-
bodies the principle that defamation liability must allow sufficient
protection not only for truthful statements, but also for statements
that speakers believe are truthful, so that speakers enjoy leeway to
make errors.'94
As in prior editions, the authors use a few principal cases to de-
velop the common law doctrine and more fully explore common law
doctrines in notes and comments accompanying the principal cases.
The materials on federal constitutional doctrines include the standard
Supreme Court cases that have established the federal constitutional
limitations on defamation actions'9" and a few illustrative federal lower
court and state court cases as well. One striking aspect of defamation
law is the courts' rejection of the principle of internalization of the cost
of harm to others, a principle that dominates products liability.'
Privacy is clearly an area of contemporary interest. In presenting
the law of privacy, Franklin and Rabin follow the well-settled and oft-
cited Prosser categorization of privacy tort actions. Prosser sorted pri-
vacy case law into four causes of action: publication of private facts,
intrusion into seclusion, false-light privacy, and appropriation of like-
ness.'97 The cases in all of these areas tend to be somewhat sui generis,
largely frustrating efforts to draw anything but the most general legal
principals from the case law. However, the authors should make more
of an effort to give the student a broader philosophical perspective on
privacy. Moreover, by the time students reach law school and torts
class, they have surely been exposed to the broader societal debate re-
garding privacy. The authors should explain the relationship between
privacy torts and other privacy issues that have engaged the legal
community's, and more broadly society's, attention. In particular, the
authors should distinguish privacy interests in limiting public knowl-
edge of personal information from privacy interests that reflect the de-
193. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
194. Id. at 270-72, 278-84.
195. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), reprinted as excerpted in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 1000-11, 1025-
36, 1063-67; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Inc., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
196. The authors note this anomaly. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 1038 (Note 7).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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sire for autonomy, i.e., the privacy concerns underlying such contro-
versial legal issues like abortion rights and gay rights.'98 Moreover,
some discussion of the relatively modest statutory privacy protections,
haphazard though they are, may increase students' appreciation of tort
law's place within the broader field of privacy.199
Privacy law will challenge civil libertarians, because privacy is-
sues create friction between two highly valued interests: freedom of
speech and the right to be left alone. For example, cases like the New
York Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case)" 0 or Pear-
son v. Dodd2"' present relatively clear cut cases. The contest in both
cases involved free speech on one side and the government's interests
in secrecy on the other. In New York Times, the federal government
sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post's
publication of purloined Defense Department documents. In Pearson,
a United States Senator sought to recover damages for columnist Drew
Pearson's publication of documents taken surreptitiously from Dodd's
Senate office by one of the Senator's aides. Cases like Bartnicki v.
Vopper.2 and Florida Star v. B.J.F."° present more troubling ques-
tions because in such cases the contest is not between free speech and
some governmental interest, but rather between free speech and the
legitimate privacy interests of individual citizens who wish to shield
intimate information about themselves from the broader public.
Franklin and Rabin do not cover, at least in any concentrated
fashion, physical, emotional, and economic harms resulting from pub-
lication, a growing area of litigation. Franklin and Rabin touch on it
briefly when exploring liability for failure to control the conduct of
others,20 4 liability for pure economic harm,205 and liability for inten-
198. Indeed, the privacy interests at issue in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion), and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right to die) were autonomy interests-the right to be
able to make for oneself important decisions about life unconstrained by the government-rather
than informational privacy. See Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law En-
forcement Use of Deception as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 745, 755 n.21 (1999).
See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) ("[tlhe cases sometimes characterized as pro-
tecting privacy have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests[:] [o]ne is the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independ-
ence in making certain kinds of important decisions").
199. I have done work relating tort law doctrines of privacy to criminal procedure cases
defining an individuals privacy rights vis-d-vis the government and particularly law enforcement.
While they are nominally equated, the results in the cases and the doctrines can be quite differ-
ent. See Bell, supra note 198.
200. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
201. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
202. 531 U.S. 990 (2001).
203. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
204. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 190.
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tional infliction of emotional distress.20 6 Granted, the law in the area
remains quite undeveloped, but the underlying issues warrant atten-
tion nevertheless.
The cases in this area have involved several different types of
claims. First, some plaintiffs claim that they suffered injury when re-
lying on defendant media entity's negligently made, erroneous state-
ments.2" 7 Second, some plaintiffs complain about accurate material
that implicitly encourages them to attempt a dangerous maneuver that
they then unsuccessfully attempt to perform, injuring themselves in
the process. 28  Third, some victims of assaults have brought actions
against media entities for facilitating the assault either by printing ad-
vertisements that allowed professional assassins and potential custom-
ers to find one another or by providing detailed instructions on perpe-
trating the crime.20 9
III. TEACHING LAWYERING SKILLS
Franklin and Rabin's casebook facilitates a teacher's efforts in
imparting important legal skills, in addition to helping the teacher im-
part the substance of tort law. Lawyers must think creatively about
facts, and students should begin honing this essential lawyering skill
early in their law school careers. Through their selection of cases and
crafting of questions in the notes following the cases, the authors en-
able professors to press their students to think creatively about charac-
terizing facts in differing ways that have differing legal implications.
Mark F. Grady's Untaken Precautions provides an excellent explana-
tion of the central role played by the lawyer's conceptualization of a
case's factual setting.210 In particular, he notes that lawyers generally
choose to focus on a very limited aspect of a defendant's conduct in
identifying a defendant's alleged breach of duty, and this choice affects
205. Id. at 312 (summarizing Gutter v. Dow Jones, 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986)).
206. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 905-10 (excerpting Hustler Magazine v. Fal-
well, 486 U.S. 46 (1988)).
207. See Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Information in
Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195 (1999). The first type of case poses hard questions regarding the
distinction between the liability of a professional who gives advice in person and an author who
gives the same advice by means of a book, videotape, or other tangible item. There are also
tricky distinctions between maps, which courts view as products subject to strict liability, and
books, which are not treated as products. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676 (2d
Cir. 1983) (erroneous navigational charts may give rise to a strict products liability claim).
208. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
209. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Braun v. Soldier of For-
tune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (llth Cir. 1992).
210. Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGALSTUD. 139 (1989).
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the lawyer's, and his adversary's, approach to every element of the
case.
Though the authors do so infrequently, at times they raise won-
derful questions that encourage students to develop their skills at con-
ceptualizing the facts from different perspectives. They include the
classic question of whether Mrs. Palsgraf, whose negligence claim was
rejected in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, could have asserted an al-
ternative theory of the case that would have succeeded. Franklin and
Rabin ask a similar question about Adams v. Bullock, but the same
can be done, for example, with Strauss v. Bell Terre Realty212 and
Harper v. Herman,2 even though Franklin and Rabin provide no such
question following those cases.214
The casebook does not sufficiently impart to students the impor-
tance of developing facts. Some of the most significant contemporary
tort cases involve factual complexity and tests lawyers' skills at devel-
oping facts as much or more than it tests their prowess at legal analy-
sis. The potential liability of Ford Motor Company and Goodyear
Tire and Rubber for tire tread separations leading drivers of Ford Ex-
plorers to lose control of their vehicles involves significant factual is-
sues and has posed a challenge to plaintiffs in terms of amassing the
facts to prevail. Perhaps an implicit devaluation of factual develop-
ment is an inevitable feature of the case method, in which "the facts"
are largely taken as a given-the typical judicial opinion outlines the
facts after they have been developed and organized by the parties. In-
211. 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
212. 482 N.E. 2d 34 (N.Y. 1985). Strauss could have advanced the theory that Con Ed
breached its duty to provide electricity to his apartment, disabling Strauss's electric water pump
and necessitating his fateful trip down the darkened common area stairway in search of water.
213. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). In Harper, a boat owner anchors a boat in a few feet
of water to allow his guests to go swimming. As he does so, one of the guests asks the owner if
he is going swimming and then immediately dives in. Predictably, the guest suffers a severe spi-
nal injury. The court ruled that the boat owner had no duty to warn his guest of the dangers-
his was an act of nonfeasance where there was no affirmative duty to act. However, students can
sometimes figure out, if asked to think creatively, that the guest's lawyer could have argued that
the boat owner had engaged in misfeasance, in that the owner anchored the boat in shallow wa-
ter, could reasonably anticipate that guests who chose to swim would dive into the water, and yet
did not issue a general warning before he anchored. This is a good, general point about duty to
rescue made by Weinrib, supra note 25, at 251-58.
214. Another example is a point raised early by the authors, but then abandoned: that
courts should require business conduct to satisfy the risk/utility test, but should not hold per-
sonal conduct to that same demanding standard. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 44 (Note
2). Such a judgment would rest on the assumption that business entities possess a greater capac-
ity than individuals to analyze their prospective conduct fully and systematically. In the context
of the Carroll Towing case, Franklin and Rabin ask whether the bargee's absence is a personal or
business dereliction. It appears to be personal, but the students who are beginning to catch on
will realize, when prompted, that the absence of a bargee could also be characterized as a busi-
ness decision-the barge company decided not to staff the barge with two people.
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deed, a different perspective on the manner in which lawyers organize
facts and the difficulties advocates face in amassing them might be
provided by documents written by lawyers to justify initiating or purs-
ing a case.21s
In fairness, the authors do explore some of the difficulties caused
by situations in which the available evidence is frequently inadequate
and, in many ways, the authors give proof problems more attention in
this edition than they have previously. 216 Of course, some tort doc-
trines and major tort cases really focus very precisely on proof prob-
lems, and the authors explore those doctrines and cases. Thus, the au-
thors do devote substantial attention to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor, a doctrine focused on cases in which there is little proof of
the precise nature of a defendant's negligence.217 Proof problems seem
to assume particular significance with regard to the actual cause ele-
ment of negligence cases.
The book's actual cause section features Summers v. Tice, and
Hymonowitz v. Ely Lilly, Inc., two widely used cases that turn on the
difficulty of proving critical facts. However, Summers and Hy-
monowitz present such intractable proof problems that exploring the
cases does little to encourage students to think about how facts are
proved. In a sense, students must merely take as a given the impossi-
bility of discovering the facts critical to a conventional resolution of
the two cases. However, Franklin and Rabin also feature two addi-
tional lesser-known cases raising proof problems: Stubbs v. City of
Rocheste2 18 and now Zuchowicz v. United States.219 These cases, in
which there is some evidence relevant to causation, give students a
greater appreciation of the skill of uncovering facts and crafting them
into a coherent whole.220
Nevertheless, the authors routinely edit or summarize the factual
section of principal cases so that only the essential facts remain. In do-
ing so they save space, but as a result students need not hone the skills
215. Of course, it may be difficult to gain access to such documents.
216. The changes in the materials regarding vicarious liability and actual causation in par-
ticular place a greater emphasis on factual issues.
217. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 91-109.
218. 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 342-46.
219. 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). This case deals with the use of expert evidence and the
approach to the admissibility of such evidence set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrel Dow Pharmaceutical, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 72-73,
109-17, 349-59. Even the new loss of a chance of life case has complex factual issues, including
expert testimony issues. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 359-65 (citing Alberts v. Schultz,
975 P.2d 1279 (N.M. 1999)).
220. When dealing with custom, medical malpractice, and Daubert, the authors also allude,
perhaps as much as they should for first-year students, to proof problems related to the use of
expert witnesses.
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of identifying the most relevant facts from among a mass of facts.
Moreover, students might be given some greater appreciation for the
challenge of identifying, discovering, and distilling key facts.
For instance, in exploring the concepts of actual and constructive
notice, the authors could encourage students to consider how a lawyer
representing an injured shopper would go about proving that a super-
market had actual or constructive notice of a spill. Indeed, a relatively
simple exercise can give students a greater appreciation of the prob-
lematic nature of the notice requirement and the attractiveness of the
alternative mode-of-operation rule, adopted by the courts in some ju-
risdictions, which relieves plaintiffs of the burden of proving that de-
fendant had notice of a particular spill.221 In particular, I give my stu-
dents a hypothetical concerning a customer who has fallen on spilled
coffee and ask my students to tell me the information they need to
prevail and the means they would use to acquire it. I ask them to
specify who they would interview or depose. This gives my students a
concrete understanding of how difficult notice may be to prove, but it
also gives them a greater understanding of the way in which the mode-
of-operation rule entirely changes both the evidence that the parties
must develop and the ultimate factual question the court must an-
swer.2 2
2
The authors sharpen students' legal analysis by presenting ar-
guably conflicting cases. The professor can ask students to discuss
whether the cases are consistent with one another, or whether one
overrules the other. The following groups of cases provide good com-
parisons: (1) Adams v. Bullock,223 Braun v. Buffalo General Electric
Co.,224 and Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.;225 (2) Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman226 and Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.;227
(3) Negri v. Stop & Shop, Inc.22' and Gordon v. American Museum of
Natural History;229 and (4) Martin v. Herzog23 and Tedla v. Ellman.
231
221. The exercise can also give the students a hint of the constraints the rules of evidence
can impose upon lawyers, while also giving them experience in interpreting law in the form of
rule rather than case decision. In particular, I provide them with New Jersey Rule of Evidence
number 404, the standard rule which limits the admissibility of proof of prior conduct. (These
rules are identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 407-409.)
222. One could do more. For instance, a case study crafted by Alan Kaminsky can be
adapted for use as an exercise in which students must focus on development of the facts. ALAN
KAMINSKY, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREMISES SECURITY LITIGATION 79-103 (1995).
223. 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
224. 94 N.E. 206 (N.Y. 1919).
225. 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
226. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
227. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
228. 480 N.E.2d 740 (N.Y. 1985).
229. 492 N.E.2d 774 (N.Y. 1986).
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Procedural matters warrant substantial attention in most first-
year courses, not just in Civil Procedure. Students need to appreciate
the significance a case's procedural posture holds for the legal princi-
pal the case establishes. That procedural posture is critical to discern-
ing the legal principal established by the case and the breadth of its
reach. Students must understand the significance of a case's proce-
dural posture if they are to learn to cite cases appropriately and effec-
tively in support of legal arguments. In addition, of course, attention
to procedural matters helps students treat law as more than a set of
doctrinal rules that they must memorize. In particular, students will
be encouraged to think about law pragmatically as a framework for ei-
ther litigating cases on behalf of clients or counseling clients232
Franklin and Rabin's casebook lends itself to an emphasis on
procedural issues. The authors begin the book with a nice description
of the civil litigation process.233 They also provide supplemental notes
on relevant procedural issues, such as class action litigation.234 In ad-
dition, they frequently pose questions that encourage students to con-
template the litigation process and lawyers' strategic decisions to raise
certain issues and disregard others.
Torts affords relatively few opportunities for students to practice
either advising clients prior to litigation or drafting legal documents.
However, perhaps in reviewing the economic harm materials, profes-
sors can ask students to put themselves in the position of a lawyer rep-
resenting a company that is purchasing a business or lending money
and, in doing so, is relying upon an accountant's report it did not
commission. Students would then need to think strategically about
the representations their client should seek while the deal is being
structured to enhance their litigating position if the transaction ulti-
mately results in losses.23 Another exercise, in conjunction with ex-
ploration of the materials on explicit assumption of risk, might involve
drafting an enforceable release of tort liability.236
230. 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920).
231. 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939). The authors do not provide students with information
regarding contemporary New York courts' efforts to reconcile these two decisions. I have sup-
plied a bit of an explanation of contemporary judicial approaches to statutory violations using the
Restatement as a resource. Ultimately, the central issue really appears to be what types of excuses
a court accepts as justifying a departure from statutorily required conduct, rather than whether a
departure is considered evidence of negligence or negligence per se.
232. The authors do a good job on the practical aspects of torts litigation in their chapter on
damages and insurance.
233. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 1, at 9-17.
234. Id. at 394-95.
235. See generally id. at 302-08.
236. See generally id. at 467-68.
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An even more complex exercise might enhance students' appre-
ciation of the challenges posed by technological advances. In explor-
ing products liability, a professor might ask students to advise a com-
pany that is designing in-vehicle technologies of the potential tort
liabilities that await it, and whether design modifications might reduce
liability. For example, will cell phone manufacturers start becoming
targets of suits brought by victims of inattentive drivers who were us-
ing their cell phones when they had an accident?
IV. CONCLUSION
Franklin and Rabin provide an excellent overview of torts. The
casebook captures the overarching questions with which courts and
torts scholars grapple. The authors explore the shifting boundaries of
negligence and strict/absolute liability. However, the book does much
more, exploring questions regarding the underlying basis of tort law-
is it primarily driven by conclusions about moral desert or efficiency
in deterring injuries and compensating the injured, what are the re-
spective institutional roles and responsibilities of legislatures and
courts, and what impact does tort law have on citizens' ability to fully
participate in society?
Torts is a field of sometimes bewildering breadth and complex-
ity, in which there are always numerous developments on a wide vari-
ety of fronts. Franklin and Rabin continue to bring order to the field's
complexity with their time-tested underlying organization. Yet the
authors also introduce students to many of the field's nuances,
particularly through their deft use of notes. They also manage to
familiarize students with some of the practical aspects of this often
quite practical field-aspects like insurance coverage and calculation
of damages. Moreover, the authors have again in this seventh edition
captured many of the important currents of change in tort law.
In sum, Franklin and Rabin's Tort Law and Alternatives contin-
ues to provide an excellent introduction to the wide world of torts.
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